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Abstract

The Nursing Home Compare System supported by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services
(CMS) is being widely used by patients, medical providers and payers. However, evidence suggests that
the rating system is prone to self-reporting inflation, leading to biased and misleading ratings. This
dissertation consists of three essays analyzing a series of issues that arise in this rating system, including
inflation detection, performance evaluation, audit design, and technology adoption.
In the first essay, we use data over 2009-2013 for 1219 California nursing homes to empirically
examine the key factors affecting a nursing home’s rating. We find a significant association between a
nursing home’s rating change and its profits, and then demonstrate this association does not always lead
to legitimate efforts to improve service quality, but can induce self-reporting inflation. A prediction
model is then developed to evaluate the extensiveness of inflation based on which 6 to 8.5% of the
nursing homes are identified as likely inflators.
Given limited CMS resources, it is important to optimize the inspection process and develop an
effective audit process to control inflation. In the second essay, we first formulate the inspection problem
by using an innovative graph-based method, and solve the problem based on CMS data. The results
support CMS’s current practice in term of minimizing inflation detection difficulty, and suggest an audit
system. We then conduct a detailed simulation study on the optimal audit parameter settings. Our result
suggests a moderate audit policy to balance the tradeoff between audit net budget and efficiency.
IoT technologies enable automatic data collection, which can release nursing homes from selfreporting burden and reduce the possibility of misreporting. However, IoT technologies can be costly,

and CMS may consider subsidizing IoT adoption to control inflation. In the third essay, we develop a
two-level game theoretical framework to study how IoT adoption can affect nursing homes’ operational
decisions, and how CMS should subsidize IoT adoption. We analyze reactions of honest and inflating
nursing homes to IoT adoption, and analyze how CMS can control IoT adoption by auditing and
subsidization.

We also obtain insights on budget allocation between subsidization and audit.
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Chapter 1. Introduction
Ratings are commonly used to compare and evaluate alternative choices. The rating mechanisms
vary across different application domains: some ratings, such as the vehicle safety ratings, are generated
through a rigorous inspection procedure or expert evaluation. Some other ratings are obtained based on
customer reviews, such as Amazon product ratings. Another type of rating is created based on selfreported measures, such as MBA rankings. There are also rating systems in which ratings are calculated
based on a combination of the above methods. The Nursing Home Compare supported by Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) which is based on a combination of inspection results and
nursing homes’ self-reported measures is an example of these rating systems,
There are over 16000 nursing homes in the United States currently. They provide care to over 1.5
million residents (Jones et al. 2009) (Donald and Fowles 2012). In year 2012 only, CMS spent $140
billion on long-term services and supports (Eiken et al. 2014). Given the importance of nursing homes in
the quality of life of patients and the billions of dollars spent on these facilities, in 2008, CMS launched
its nursing home rating system, which has been widely used by patients, doctors, and insurance
companies since its inception (Duhigg 2007).
The system gives a star rating in a 1-5 scale for each nursing home based on three domains of
Health Inspection, Staffing and Quality Measures(QM). The Health Inspection is conducted annually by
licensed inspectors, while the other two measures are self-reported by nursing homes.

Once the

inspection and self-reported data are collected, CMS will assign a star rating to each of the three domains.
The overall rating is then calculated by using the Health Inspection rating as a baseline, adding one star if
any self-reported domain is 5 stars and subtracting one star if any self-reported domain is 1 star.
The presence of self-reported measures in the overall rating calculating procedure renders the
possibility of inflation. Cases have been reported where patients’ personal experience differs significantly
from what the star ratings suggest. Some highly rated nursing homes are providing substandard cares,
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even leading to the death of patients. Despite the importance of these issues, there have been very limited
research on these topics. Does rating inflation exist? If so, how extensive is the inflation? What are the
characteristics of those inflators? How to effectively conduct inspection? How to design an audit system
in order to detect and deter inflation? How can information technologies can be used to improve the
rating system? In this dissertation, we will address these questions in detail.
In Chapter 2, we first conduct an empirical analysis to demonstrate the existence of rating
inflation. We collect the CMS rating data over 2009-2013 and the corresponding financial data reported
by Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development and patients’ complaints data reported by
California Department of Public Health for 1219 nursing homes in California.

To understand the

importance of high ratings to nursing homes, we empirically examine the key factors affecting the star
rating change of a nursing home. We find a significant association between the changes in a nursing
home’s star rating and its profits, which points to a financial incentive for nursing homes to inflate the
ratings. It is however still possible that the star rating increase comes from nursing homes’ legitimate
efforts to improve their service qualities.

To demonstrate rating inflation does exist, we use the

independent patients’ complaint data as a proxy of the nursing homes’ true service quality, and
demonstrate that the association between rating change and financial incentive is beyond what can be
explained by legitimate efforts. A prediction model is then developed to evaluate the extensiveness of
inflation. The results suggest that among the suspect population, 6 to 8.5% of the nursing homes are
likely inflators. We then conduct a variable importance analysis and summarize the key characteristics of
likely inflators, which provide useful insights for CMS to conduct future audit. In this chapter, we are
able to empirically demonstrate the existence of rating inflation in CMS’s nursing home rating system,
and provide a quantifiable estimate of the system performance. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
first study to do so. We also reveal the underlying driving force of rating inflation, and show the key
features of likely inflators, which provides useful information for CMS’s future audit design and
regulation.
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In chapter 3, we discuss the methods to optimize and improve the rating system. The selfreporting in the rating procedure brings in possibility of inflation. If all the three domains are inspected,
there will be no room for nursing homes to inflate. However, due to limited resources, CMS can only
inspect one domain. Therefore, it is important to know which domain is the optimal choice for inspection.
To address this question, we develop an innovative graph-based method to formulate the problem, and
solve it with different objective functions based on CMS’s historical data. The results of our analysis
show that the staffing measure is optimal if CMS wants to minimize the population of nursing homes who
can inflate, but the measure that CMS is currently inspecting is optimal in term of minimizing the
difficulty to detect inflators, and will work well together with an effective audit system. Unfortunately,
CMS currently does not have an audit system for the rating system. When designing the audit system, we
consider nursing homes’ reactions to different audit policies, and conduct a simulation to study the
optimal audit parameter settings. Our results show a tradeoff between the audit net budget and audit
efficiency. Increasing punishment rate is an economical way for CMS to save net budget, but will lead to
more resources wasted on auditing honest nursing homes. CMS should use a moderate audit policy in
order to carefully balance the tradeoff between audit net budget and audit efficiency.
In recent years, Internet of Things (IoT) technologies are becoming popular among nursing
homes. IoT devices are being used to track patients’ movements and health conditions, and the data is
automatically collected and communicated through network, which improves the productivity and
efficiency of nursing staff, and the overall care quality. IoT can change the way a nursing home operates,
and thus affect the nursing home’s optimal operational decisions. From CMS’s perspective, the selfreporting procedure imposes heavy burden on nursing homes’ operations. IoT can release nursing homes
from this burden, and can reduce the possibility of misreporting, and thus can be a good method to control
self-reporting inflation. Despite these advantages, IoT technologies can be costly for nursing homes to
adopt, and thus CMS may consider subsidizing nursing homes for IoT adoption. In chapter 4, we develop
a game theoretical framework to study how IoT adoption can affect nursing homes optimal staffing
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decisions, and how CMS should subsidize IoT adoption as an alternative way to control self-reporting
inflation. We develop a two-level problem structure, with CMS optimizing audit policies and IoT
subsidization amount to minimize self-reporting inflation damage at the higher level, and nursing homes
optimizing IoT adoption and staffing level to maximize profits at the lower level. We analyze the
different reactions of honest and inflating nursing homes to IoT adoption, and find that inflators are more
reluctant to adopt IoT since it limits the amount they can inflate. For both inflators and honest nursing
homes, we find diversified staffing level changes after IoT adoption due to the complementary and
substitution effects of IoT adoption, i.e., for highly ranked nursing homes, IoT adoption decreases its
optimal staffing level and for poorly ranked nursing homes, IoT adoption increases its optimal staffing
level. We also study how CMS can affect nursing homes’ IoT adoption and in turn control self-reporting
inflation by auditing and subsidization. At last, we provide insights for CMS to allocate limited budget
between subsidization and auditing. The model presented in this chapter suggests a new direction that
CMS may want to consider in its rating system reform. By subsidizing IoT adoption, CMS’s incentive to
control self-reporting inflation can be aligned with nursing homes’ incentives to maximize profit, and the
overall service quality of nursing homes can also be improved at the same time. Comparing with wasting
resource auditing honest nursing homes, allocating limited budgets on IoT subsidization under certain
conditions can be CMS’s optimal choice.
We conclude the thesis in chapter 5. CMS’s nursing home rating system comes a long way to
evolve to today’s form, and the reforming never stops. It is extremely important for CMS to fully
understand the issues in the current system, such that the reforms can move towards the correct and most
effective direction. This dissertation provides insights on various aspects of the current rating system.
The results can be very helpful and serves as a guideline for CMS to improve the current rating system,
and allocate limited budget more efficiently.
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Chapter 2. Winning at All Costs: Analysis of Inflation in Nursing Homes’
Rating System
2.1 Introduction
Nearly two million Americans spend an average of 835 days of their life in one of the 15,700 nursing
home facilities in the United States (National Center for Health Statistics 2009). The Department of
Health and Human Services estimates that in 2009, 4.1% of Americans over 65 years old lived in these
facilities. This percentage increases with age, ranging from 1.1 percent in the population of 65 to 74
years old to 13.2% in the population older than 85 (Fowles 2012). In 2012 only, Medicaid spent $140
billion on long-term services and supports (Eiken et al. 2014). Despite the importance of nursing homes
in the quality of life of millions of Americans and the billions of dollars spent on them, very little
information has been available about their service quality.

The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid

Services (CMS) designed and implemented its nursing home rating system after a congressional hearing
in 2007 where Senator Ron Wyden asked “why it was easier to shop for washing machines than it is to
select a nursing home” (Duhigg, 2007). Given the lack of alternative information resources on nursing
homes, the publicly available CMS rating has become the gold standard in the industry since its inception,
and has been widely popular among patients, physicians and payers (Thomas 2014). The recent study of
Werner et al. (2016) sheds light on the importance of CMS ratings for nursing homes; according to their
analysis after the release of the ratings the market share of 1-star facilities decreased by eight percent
while the market share of 5-star facilities increased by more than six percent.
Given the important role of CMS’s nursing home rating system, nursing homes would have a
significant incentive to improve their ratings. However, these ratings may not always reflect true quality.
Cases have been reported in which highly rated nursing homes only provide sub-standard care, even lead
to the death of patients. It is possible that the rating system is prone to inflation by nursing homes, and
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the objective of this research is to investigate the existence and the extent of inflation in the CMS’s
nursing home rating system.
This chapter is based on the publicly available data provided by multiple government agencies
including CMS, California Statewide Health Planning and Development (OSHPD), and California
Department of Public Health (CDPH). Our empirical strategy consists of four steps as discussed below.
First, we explore the financial incentives for nursing homes to improve their star ratings using a
combination of CMS rating data and OSHPD financial data. We find a significant positive association
between the change in star ratings and the financial incentives. That is, nursing homes with higher
financial incentives are more likely to improve star ratings after self-reporting. Second, to prove the
existence of rating inflation, we initially analyze the correlation between the CMS inspection and nursing
homes’ self-reported results. If the self-reported improvement is legitimate, we expect it to be reflected in
the inspection results of the subsequent period. We also expect CMS inspection rating and self-reported
ratings within the same year to be closely associated. Our correlation analysis results, however, shows
almost no correlation between the inspection and self-reported results, and sheds doubt on the legitimacy
of self-reported measures. We then further corroborate the results of our correlation analysis by
examining additional data on patient complaints provided by CDPH: if we assume that the ratings are not
inflated, then we should observe similar service qualities among the nursing homes with similar overall
ratings. Moreover, we should observe increased service quality among the nursing homes that initially
had the same inspection rating but ended up with a higher overall rating as a result of their high selfreported measures. Our results, however, show significant differences between the service qualities of the
nursing homes with the same overall rating. Moreover, no significant difference exists in the service
quality of nursing homes with the same inspection rating. The result serves as strong evidence on the
existence of inflation in the current rating system as it points to the fact that the service quality is
predicted by the health inspection ratings which cannot be inflated, rather than the overall ratings which
can be inflated. Third, to estimate the extent of rating inflation, we develop a prediction model and apply
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it to estimates the proportion of nursing homes that have inflated their self-reported ratings. By using a 95%
confidence interval, we identify around 6% of nursing homes in the suspect population to be likely
inflators in the current system. Fourth, we conduct a variable importance analysis to classify the factors
that their change contributes the most to the probability of being an inflator. Our results demonstrate the
shortcomings of the current rating systems and call for significant reforms in how CMS and other payers
evaluate the quality of nursing homes.
The chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 2.2, we discuss the background and conceptual
framework of our research, including the history and evolvement of the rating system, the rating
generation mechanism and potential issues, and propose the theoretical framework to deal with these
issues. In Section 2.3, we review related literature on nursing home quality measures, misbehavior
detection and quantifying methods. In Section 2.4, we describe our data collection procedure and explore
the underlying financial incentives for nursing homes to improve their ratings. In Section 2.5, we first
perform correlation analysis between the CMS-conducted inspection and self-reported measures, which
cast doubt on the existence of rating inflation. We then demonstrate our conclusion by performing a more
rigorous complaint-based analysis. A prediction model is developed in Section 2.6 to identify likely
rating inflators and evaluate the performance of the system. A variable importance analysis is then
conducted to show key characteristics of the inflators. We conclude the whole chapter in Section 2.7, and
discuss the limitations and future work.

2.2. Background and Theoretical Framework
2.2.1 The History of Nursing Home Rating System
The standardization of nursing home service quality begins before CMS was founded. In 1961, the
Public Health Service (PHS) began studying nursing homes’ state licensures, after a series of problems
being reported by the Commission on Chronic Illness from several states. The Nursing Home Standards
Guide, issued by the Public Health Service (PHS), specified 77 service standards in health and safety,
which established the foundation of nursing home service standards. From then on, this Nursing Home
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Standards Guide gradually developed and more standards were included. By 1974, a total of 90 standards
were included, covering various aspects in health and safety. In 1977, the Health Care Financing
Administration (HCFA) was created as a new federal organization, and continued the standardization and
certification of nursing home service qualities. The HCFA commissioned the Institute of Medicine (IOM)
to examine the standards in nursing home services.
A major reform on nursing homes’ regulation took place in 1987, when the Nursing Home
Reform Act (OBRA-87) was passed. The OBRA-87 established more stringent inspection, and further
specified and revised the regulations on nursing home services, including nurse training, care standards,
sanctions and remedies. It also established the use of Resident Assessment Instrument, of which the
Minimum Data Set is a major component, and is widely used today in nursing home research.
The Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) changed its name to the Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services (CMS) in 2001. CMS released its Nursing Home Compare (NHC) system in
October 1998, in the form of report card, which provides information on Medicare/Medicaid certified
nursing homes via internet. The initial system only includes nursing homes’ basic information and the
deficiencies on health and safety found in inspection, which are also covered in today’s Health Inspection.
The Staffing measure was included in the system in June 2000, and the Quality Measures were included
in November 2002 (General Accounting Office [GAO], 2002). This is the early form of today’s 3measure nursing home rating system. The NHC report card system is influential since it is one of the
earliest systems presenting publicly available standardized quality information on nursing homes.
However, the report card method suffers challenges such as the lack of consumer awareness and access
(Stevenson 2006), and the difficulties for consumers to understand the information on the report card
(Shugarman & Brown 2006).
In order to address these issues, CMS launched its Nursing Home Compare system in December
2008, which is the current system being used. This reformed rating system followed the 3-measure
setting in the previous report card system, but uses a 5-star scale on each of the three measures, which
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greatly improved the usability of the rating system. The 5-star nursing home rating system gradually
becomes the gold standard of nursing home selection. As reported by CMS (CMS 2015), the system gets
more than 1.4 million visitors per year, with 85% users reporting that they found the infor mation they are
looking for on nursing homes. The dataset used in our research covers nursing homes’ rating, complaint,
and financial data from 2009 to 2013, which are the first 5 years since the inception of the 5-star rating
system.
Starting from February 2015, CMS has gradually announced new policies to improve its nursing
homes rating system (Medicare 2016). These policies include expanding the targeted surveys, adding two
additional measures in the quality measure domain, revising the staffing algorithm, etc. However, the
framework of the 5-star rating system is not changed. By the end of 2016, CMS requires all nursing
homes to report payroll-based staffing information (CMS 2015).
2.2.2 The Current Rating Mechanism
The CMS rating system is based on three domains: Health Inspection, Staffing, and Quality measures.
While independent, CMS-certified inspectors conduct and report the health inspections, the other two
domains are self-reported by nursing homes. CMS first assigns an initial star rating to all nursing homes
based on their annual health inspection results. The health inspection looks into areas such as medication
management, nursing home administration, environment, food service, and residents’ rights and quality of
life. Ratings are given based on the number, scope, and severity of deficiencies identified during the three
most recent annual inspections (1/2 for current year, 1/3 for the previous year, and 1/6 for the second prior
year). According to CMS’s rating mechanism design, the top 10% nursing homes in health inspection
receive 5 stars, while the bottom 20% nursing homes receive 1 star. Nursing homes which rank in
between receive 2-4 stars according to a fixed proportion. There is no such restriction for self-reported
measures. Nursing homes are then assigned star ratings for the Staffing and Quality Measures domains.
The Staffing domain is evaluated based on the self-reported CMS Certification and Survey Provider
Enhanced Reports (CASPER) staffing data. Staffing domain shows the average staffing level per resident
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day of a nursing home throughout a year. The two measures covered under staffing domain are the
Registered Nursing (RN) hours per resident day, and the total nursing hours, which is the sum of
Registered Nurse(RN) hours, Licensed Practical Nurses(LPN) hours and nurse aide hours per resident day.
The results are adjusted for case-mix based on the Resource Utility Group (RUG-III) case-mix system
derived from the Minimum Data Set (MDS).
quarter when raw data is collected.

The staffing star rating is then updated by the end of the

The Quality Measure domain rating uses 9 out of 18 quality

measurement criteria developed from the MDS, which covers 7 aspects from long-stay terms and 2
aspects from short-stay terms. The quality measure data is collected by the end of each quarter and the
quality measure star rating is updated by using the results from three most recent quarters.
The overall star rating is then calculated by considering the health inspection rating as the
baseline, adding 1 star if any self-reported domain is 5 stars and subtracting 1 star if any self-reported
domain is 1 star. Nursing homes who only got 1 star in the health inspection can only have one additional
star after self-reporting 1 . The overall star rating cannot be more than 5 stars or less than 1 star. An
example is provided in Table 2-1 and Figure 2-1 to demonstrate the rating dynamics and the
corresponding events for a randomly selected nursing home in 2009.

1

Additional conditions apply to nursing homes which are in the CMS’s Special Focus Facility (SFF) program.
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Table 2-1. An Example of a Nursing Home’s Rating Dynamics
Month

Overall

Inspection

Quality Measurement

Staffing

January

2

3

2

1

February

2

3

2

1

March

2

3

2

1

April

1

3

1

1

May

1

3

1

1

June

3

4

1

2

July

4

4

2

2

August

4

4

2

2

September

4

4

2

2

October

4

4

3

2

November

4

4

3

2

December

4

4

3

2
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Figure 2-1. The Graphical Representation of a Nursing Home’s Rating Dynamics

Note: a In the first quarter of 2009, the nursing home received 3 stars in inspection. It reports 2 stars in
quality measures and 1 star in staffing. The resulting overall rating is 2 stars.
b In April, the reported quality measure reduces to 1 star, with the other two domains unchanged. As a
result, the overall rating reduces to 1 star.
c In June, a new inspection is conducted, in which the nursing home receives 4 stars. The staffing data is
also reported together with the inspection in June to be 2 stars. The resulting overall rating is 3 stars.
d In July, the quality measures are newly reported to be 2 stars. With the other do mains unchang ed, the
overall rating increases to 4 stars, since none of the self-reported domains are 1 star.
e In October, the quality measures are newly reported to be 3 stars. This change, however, does not affect
the overall rating.
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The detailed items covered in each measure are listed in Table 2-2. They measure nursing homes’
service qualities from three different angles. Generally speaking, the measures covered under health
inspection reflect how organized the nursing facility is operating; The staffing measures cover the number
of working professionals in the facility; The quality measures reflect how healthy the patients are living in
the facility. Though measuring from different perspectives, there exist close connections among these
measures (Munroe et al. 1990; Harrington et al. 2000&2012; Konetzka et al. 2004; Zhang et al. 2004;
Castle et al. 2008; Kim et al. 2009). For example, urinary tract infection (UTI) is a common health
problem found among nursing home patients, and the percentage of UTI is an important measure under
the QM domain. Research has shown that UTI is closely related to catheter insertion (Gokula et al. 2004),
which requires frequent and timely care, and as a result, an adequate level of staffing coverage. It has
also been shown that the improper use of anti-biotic agent is one of the major reasons causing UTI, and
the anti-biotic agent misusage is covered in the pharmacy service deficiencies, which are under the health
inspection domain. As a result, UTI associated problems are reflected in all the three domains. A similar
example can also be found for pressure ulcer associated problems. As a result, we argue that the three
measures, though measuring from different angles, should be correlated at certain level. An unexpected
low correlation is suspicious, and can be a preliminary evidence of misreporting.
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Table 2-2. Coverage of Each Measure (Health Inspection, Staffing, and Quality Measures)
Health Inspection (H: Health; F: Fire
Safety)
Count of Administration Deficiencies (H)

Staffing

Quality Measures (L: long-star; S: Short-stay)

RN hours/day

Count of Environmental Deficiencies (H)

LPN hours/day

Count of Mistreatment Deficiencies (H)

Nurse aide
hours/day
Total Licensed
hours/day
Total Nurse
hours/day

Percent of residents whose need for help with
activities of daily living has increased (L)
Percent of high risk residents with pressure
sores (L)
Percent of residents who have/had a catheter
inserted and left in their bladder (L)
Percent of residents who were physically
restrained (L)
Percent of residents with a urinary tract
infection (L)
Percent of residents who self-report moderate
to severe pain (L)
Percent of residents experiencing one or more
falls with major injury (L)
Percent of residents with pressure ulcers that
are new or worsened (S)
Percent of residents who self-report moderate
to severe pain (S)

Count of Nutrition and Dietary Deficiencies
(H)
Count of Pharmacy Service Deficiencies (H)
Count of Quality of Care Deficiencies (H)
Count of Resident Assessment Deficiencies
(H)
Count of Resident Rights Deficiencies (H)
Count of Building Construction Deficiencies
(F)
Count of Corridor Walls and Doors
Deficiencies (F)
Count of Electrical Deficiencies (F)
Count of Emergency Plans and Fire Drills
Deficiencies (F)
Count of Exits and Egress Deficiencies (F)
Count of Exit and Exit Access Deficiencies
(F)
Count of Fire Alarm Systems Deficiencies
(F)
Count of Furnishings and Decorations
Deficiencies (F)
Count of Hazardous Area Deficiencies (F)
Count of Illumination and Emergency
Power Deficiencies (F)
Count of Interior Finish Deficiencies (F)
Count of Laboratories Deficiencies (F)
Count of Medical Gases and Anesthetizing
Areas Deficiencies (F)
Count of Miscellaneous Deficiencies (F)
Count of Building Service Equipment
Deficiencies (F)
Count of Smoke Compartmentation and
Control Deficiencies (F)
Count of Smoking Regulations Deficiencies
(F)
Count of Automatic Sprinkler Systems
Deficiencies (F)
Count of Vertical Openings Defi ciencies (F)
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2.2.3 Potential Issues of the Current Rating Mechanism
The two self-reported domains can fundamentally change a nursing home’s overall rating. For example, it
is possible for an average nursing home that has received 3 stars in the health inspection to gain two
additional stars based on self-reported measures and become an excellent 5-star nursing home. As a result,
the overall rating can be quite different from the health inspection rating. Figure 2-2 shows how the
ratings in each of these measures have shifted to higher stars during a period of five years from 2009 to
2013. By design, the proportions of health inspection star rating remain unchanged in the 5 years, as
shown in Figure 2-2(a). However, the number of nursing homes that claim high performance in the selfreported domains has continuously increased over the past five years. As shown in Figure 2-2(b), in 2009,
about 40% of nursing homes self-reported to be 4 or 5 stars in the quality measures domain. This
percentage has increased to 60% in 2013. On the other hand, about 20% of nursing homes self-reported
to be 1 star in 2009, but less than 10% of nursing homes self-reported to be 1 star in 2013. In the staffing
domain, the number of highly rated nursing homes also significantly increased over this period, as shown
in Figure 2-2(c). Consequently, the overall rating is consistently skewed to the higher end over time. As
shown in Figure 2-2(d), the portion of 4 or 5 nursing homes increased from 35% to 55% over the 5 years.
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Figure 2-2. Distribution of Nursing Home Ratings from 2009 to 2013*

(a) On-site inspection

(b) Quality Measure

(c) Staffing

(d) Overall rating

Note: Colors represent different star rating groups
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The trend we observe in Figure 2-2 can be interpreted in two ways: On the one hand, supporters
can argue that increased levels of self-reported measures are genuine and represent an honest effort by
nursing homes to constantly improve their services. On the other hand, however, skeptics may argue that
the improved ratings are not legitimate but are rather a result of nursing homes’ success in developing
strategies to manipulate the system and inflate their ratings. Cases have been reported in which patients’
experiences differ significantly from the star ratings. Some highly-rated nursing homes are sued for
substandard care, even causing death of patients due to improper medical treatments (Thomas 2014).
Since late 2014, CMS has gradually announced new policies to improve nursing homes’ rating
system (Medicare 2016). These policies include the expansion of targeted surveys, including additional
measures in the quality measure domain, and adding the payroll information to the staffing reports.
Despite these amendments, the structure of the rating system has not been changed and it still heavily
relies on the self-reported domains and thus the newly revised system continues to be prone to
manipulation by false self-reported measures. It is not clear whether the rating increase is a result of
nursing homes’ legitimate efforts to improve their services or a signal of rating inflation, and the objective
of this research is to answer this question by investigating the existence and the extent of inflation in this
rating system.
2.2.4 Proposed Methodology and Theoretical Framework
Rating system may use different mechanisms to generate ratings but the rating data generally comes from
three sources: authority inspection (e.g., vehicle safety ratings), customer reporting (e.g., Amazon ratings)
or self-reporting (e.g., business school rankings). In the CMS’s nursing home, ratings are generated by
combining authority inspection and self-reported data in a unique way. When justifying such ratings, it is
desirable to bring in information from the customer reporting. In our rating inflation detection method,
we use the number of patient complaints as a proxy of the true service quality (Carman, et al. 1990;
Dabholkar et al. 1995; Tsaur et al. 2002). Out logic is as follows:
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1. If the ratings are not inflated, then for nursing homes with similar overall ratings, we should
expect similar service qualities, reflected in a similar number of complaints.
2. If there is no inflation, we expect increased service quality for the nursing homes whose star
rating increased after self-reporting, comparing with nursing homes who initially had the same inspection
rating but did not increase after self-reporting.
Our results, however, do not support any of the above inference. We observe a clear difference in
the number of complaints for nursing homes with the same overall rating, indicating that their service
qualities are quite different. We also observe no significant difference for nursing homes whose star
rating increased after self-reporting, indicating that their reported improvements are highly questionable.
The combined results indicate that the self-reported star rating increase cannot be simply explained by
legitimate efforts, and rating inflation does exist.
To give a quantifiable estimate of the inflation, we incorporate ideas from the decomposition
model developed by Oaxaca (Oaxaca 1973; Fairlie 2005; Bauer and Mathias 2008), which has been
commonly used for quantifying group differences.

Specifically, it decomposes the total difference

between the groups into two parts: the differences caused by the differences in individual characteristics,
and the differences caused by inconsistency in the measures. The model we developed is in line with the
Oaxaca’s idea. We divided the nursing homes into honest ones and potential inflators. We obtain the
unbiased coefficient of the honest nursing homes and use the coefficients to predict the star ratings of the
potential inflators.

By doing this, we systematically control for differences caused by individual

characteristics. A maximum predicted rating is then calculated for each of the potential inflators by using
selected confidence intervals, and is compared with the observed rating. If the observed rating is higher
than the maximum predicted rating, then significant inconsistency exists in the measures, which points to
the inflation of self-reported measures. By running this prediction model, we can identify likely inflators
in the system, and give a quantifiable system performance evaluation.
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2.3. Literature Review
The rating inflation problem is an important topic related to many inter-connected fields, including
healthcare facility operations management, healthcare policy research, and misbehavior detection. In this
section, we first review literature in each related field, and then discuss the contribution of our work to the
existing literature.
2.3.1 Healthcare Facility Operations Management
The research on the operations management of healthcare facilities includes an abundance of scholarly
work, and research topics can be categorized based on the size of the facility. The first stream of research
analyzes the efficiency of operations and quality of care at hospitals.

This line research includes

improving the patient scheduling systems (Cayirli and Veral 2003; Helm et al. 2011) and developing
strategies to address the demand fluctuations (Jack and Powers 2004), analysis of the effects of patients’
arrival time (D. Anderson et al. 2014) or the hospitals objectives (Andritsos and Aflaki 2015) on the
quality of care and creating alternative operations planning and control systems for curbing the increasing
costs of hospital services (Roth and Van Dierdonck 1995). The other line of operations research focuses
on individual physicians and small clinics. This stream includes design of public policies and novel
scheduling strategies to reduce waiting time (Chen et al. 2015) and increase clinic performance (LaGanga
and Lawrence 2012; Salzarulo et al. 2015), optimization of capacity and resources allocations and the
effect of such improvements on quality of medical services in both primary (Dobson et al. 2011; McCoy
and Johnson 2014; Zepeda and Sinha 2016) and specialty care settings (Chow et al. 2011; Güneş et al.
2015).
Though nursing homes are an important part of the U.S. health care system, operations and
production management literature often neglects them. To the best of our knowledge is limited to a few
studies on minimizing waiting times (Zhang et al. 2012) and analyzing the effects of non-profit status of
nursing homes on their service quality (Chesteen et al. 2005).
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2.3.2 Healthcare Policy Research
The health policy literature related to nursing homes is rich, and we summarize them into three
major categories. The first category of studies tries to answer the question how service quality can be
quantifiably measured. Berg et al. (2002) evaluated existing quality indicators for long-term cares. Mor et
al. (2003) used the MDS to point out that the incident-based nursing home quality measures can be
unstable. Shwartz et al. (2015) discussed the importance of using composite measures to measure
healthcare provider performance. The second category of research mainly focuses on how to improve
nursing home service qualities.

Kane et al. (2001) compared the senior patients and patients with

disabilities to show the key needs for senior people in long-term cares. Kieran (2001) discussed how
improper regulation can potentially detract from its effectiveness and lead to disappointing results.
Grabowski et al. (2014) discussed how telemedicine can reduce hospitalizations for nursing home
residents. Stavropoulou et al. (2015) examined the function of incident-reporting system in improving
patient safety. Mor et al. (2010) pointed out that the CMS payment incentives do not encourage the
incentive alignment of care providers and care beneficiaries. Many related studies on incentive alignment
problems are also conducted (Rosalie 2003; Mor et al. 2004 R. Werner and Konetzka 2010; R. Werner,
Stuart, and Polsky 2010). The third category of research discusses major problems existing in the current
nursing home market, some of which are major barriers for achieving good service quality. These
problems include racial segregation in nursing homes (Smith et al. 2007), public images distortion
(Robert J. et al. 2006; Miller et al. 2012), payment policies and litigation issues (Stevenson and David
2008; Stevenson and David 2003; Smith et al. 2007; Fennell et al. 2010; Charlene et al. 2001; William et
al. 2014; David, Angelelli, and Mor 2004; David et al. 2004).
In the above healthcare policy research, the ultimate goal is to understand how good services can
be delivered to patients. The nursing home star rating system is CMS’s attempt to implement the quality
measures developed in the literature and convey the service quality information to the public in a
transparent manner. The number of studies on this rating system is growing since its inception in 2009.
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Li et al. (2013) studied the nursing home satisfaction rate in Massachusetts and found that incorporating
consumer’s perspective would improve the CMS nursing home reporting efforts. Konetzka et al. (2015)
found that the rating system exacerbates disparities in quality by payer source. To the best of our
knowledge, there has been no healthcare policy literature looking into rating inflation issues.
2.3.3 Misbehavior Detection
Rating inflation is a typical misbehavior that frequently occurs in system operations. The detailed
method used in detecting each type of misbehavior can be different, but the common strategy is to first
identify the abnormal phenomenon which cannot be rationalized should the misbehavior not exist, then
explore the underlying incentive, usually financial-oriented, driving the phenomenon. Mayzlin, et al.
(2012) found significant differences in reviews from a given hotel between Expedia and TripAdvisor.
Since Expedia only allows its customers to post a review, its posting cost is significantly higher than
TripAdvisor, where everyone can post. Consequently, competitors have the incentive to post fake reviews
on the “free” TripAdvisor, but not on the “costly” Expedia, and the results gave a good explanation to the
observed difference in the two websites’ reviews. Duggan, et al. (2000) conducted a study on Japan’s elite
sumo wrestlers to detect statistical evidence of match rigging, and found that the winning ratio for players
on the margin is significantly higher than players who are not. They showed that the incentive structure of
promotion leads to gains from trade between wrestlers on the margin for achieving a winning record, and
the observed higher winning ratio cannot be simply explained by legitimate effort. Jocob et al. (2003)
studied teachers’ cheating behavior using data from Chicago public schools. He found evidence indicating
that high-powered incentive systems, especially those with bright line rules, may induce unexpected
behavioral distortions such as cheating.
In the above studies, a measure of the abnormal phenomenon, such as review scores, winning
ratio or consistent wrong answer patterns, can be easily accessible. However, due to the illicit nature, the
people committing misbehaviors usually attempt not to leave evidence. As a result, sometimes a good
measure of the abnormal phenomenon cannot be easily identified, and a good proxy variable is needed to
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perform the analysis. DellaVigna, et al. (2010) proposed a method to detect illegal arms trade between
countries under arms embargo by using the weapon manufacturers’ stock prices as a proxy and analyzing
their fluctuations as turmoil and conflicts arise at certain geographical areas. Engelberg, et al. (2014)
used the geographic distance between a doctor’s office and drug company headquarters to instrument for
the likelihood of pecuniary transfers. They found evidence that doctors tilt prescriptions in favor of the
paying firm’s drugs, shifting away from both branded and generic substitutes.
2.3.4 Contribution of This Research
Our research makes contribution to the existing literature in several dimensions.

For operation

management literature, nursing homes have not been the research focus though they are very important in
the U.S. healthcare system. The reasons for this neglect of research in nursing home operations can be
complicated, but can be partially attribute to the lack of effective and objective performance measures.
Different from hospitals and clinics, nursing homes’ patients are residents at the same time, and a lot of
efficiency-related performance measures for hospitals and clinics, such as waiting time, readmission rates,
do not apply for nursing homes. Many nursing home problems, however, are the results of chronical
misbehaviors in the daily care, which may not be objectively measured. Our research results provide a
better understanding of the nursing home performance measures, and the potential inflation in the
measures, thus fill up the gap in the nursing home operations management field.
For healthcare policy literature, the existing studies are based on the assumption that the reported
data is truth-reflecting and the unbiased results can be delivered to the public. If inflation exists in the
rating procedure, then no matter how complete the quality measures are developed or how effective the
policies are set, they do not have a truth-reflecting and solid ground, and the results will be biased and
misleading. Our research targets the authenticity of the reported data and the ratings directly, and
provides a solid ground for other research which rely on these data.
Nursing home rating system inflation belongs to the type of problems in which the phenomenon,
or the difference between honest nursing homes and inflators, can be difficult to identify, both cross-
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sectional and longitudinal.

The difficulties lie in the following aspects.

First, the inflators are

confounded with the honest nursing homes whose star ratings also increase after self-reporting, thus
ratings cannot be directly used as a measure of inflation. Furthermore, there has been no audit system
implemented for the self-reported measures, and there is no data for caught inflators available, which can
be used to summarize unique characteristics of inflators. As a result, there is no training data for
machine-learning based techniques, making it challenging to design detection methods. From the time
dimension perspective, the self-reported measures have been used for years without being audited, thus
the rating patterns, though probably inflated, can be very consistent over the years. The lack of external
shock also makes it challenging to identify abnormal patterns in the rating data. To overcome these
difficulties, we bring in the information from the patients’ side, and use the number of complaints as a
proxy variable of the true service quality. We then derive contradiction to show that the self-reported
rating increase is beyond what can be explained by legitimate efforts.

Theoretically, our research

provides a framework for detecting rating system inflations: For any product or service to be rated, the
ratings are generated from authority inspection, self-reporting, consumer reporting or their combinations.
The three are correlated and can be good proxy variables for justifying others and detecting rating
inflation.
Most of the existing research only focuses on proving the existence of misbehaviors. However,
system reform often takes time, and it is always necessary to give a quantifiable evaluation on the current
system’s performance. To the best of our knowledge, few papers have addressed this issue before. Our
research makes contribution to the existing literature by not only demonstrating the existence of rating
inflation, but providing a systematical method to quantifiable estimate the extensiveness of rating
inflation.
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2.4. Data Collection and Financial Incentive Analysis
2.4.1 Data Collection
Our analysis is based on publicly available datasets from three sources: CMS, OSHPD and CDPH. The
CMS dataset includes performance details on each of the criteria used within the three domains of
inspection, staffing and quality measures. For each nursing home, these detailed metrics are accompanied
with the corresponding star rating in the three domains as well as the overall star rating. This dataset also
includes other descriptive details for nursing homes such as location, size, certification, ownership
information and council type. The pooled dataset consists of records from 1219 nursing homes in the state
of California over the first five years since the inception of the 5-star rating system, i.e., from year 2009 to
2013.
The OSHPD data includes detailed financial information on California nursing homes over the
same period of time. In this dataset, nursing homes’ source of revenue is categorized into healthcare and
non-healthcare sections. The healthcare section is further classified by revenue source into Medicare,
Medicaid 2 , Self-paying, Managed Care and others. The corresponding revenue and expense details for
each section are provided, and the profits can be easily calculated.
The CDPH data is provided through the Health Facilities Consumer Information System (HFCIS)
website. A consumer portal is also available on the HFCIS website through which a complaint against a
facility can be filed directly. CDPH inspects nursing homes at least once every 6 to 15.9 months in
response to these complaints as well as other accidents or incidents that are required to report by nursing
homes themselves, such as fires, disasters, suspected abuse, etc. Depending on the deficiencies found
during the investigation, various types of citations will be issued. A deficiency violating state laws will
be issued a state citation, and if it also violates federal law, it will also be reported to CMS and included
in the federal inspection for determining star rating. The CDPH data we collected contains detailed

2

In California, Medicaid is referred to as Medi -Cal. However, we use Medicaid as the category name in this
chapter, in order to avoid confusion for readers from other states.

24

patient complaints, which will be used as a proxy of the nursing home’s service quality. Note that the
state level agency CDPH and the federal level agency CMS, though may overlap sometimes, have
independent jurisdictions on nursing home inspections. The CDPH complaints may not be included in
CMS’s star rating procedure, and the deficiencies covered in CMS’s inspection may not result from a
CDPH complaint.
2.4.2 Nursing Homes’ Financial Incentive
The observed rating improvement consists of both legitimate efforts and self-reported inflation. In order
to demonstrate the existence of rating inflation we should show that the rating increase is beyond a range
which can be explained by legitimate efforts. In our model, we perform the financial incentive analysis to
establish the connection between a nursing home’s financial incentive and the increase in its star rating.
We then show that this increase is far beyond the limit which can be explained by legitimate efforts.
We combine the CMS rating data and OSHPD financial data to demonstrate the financial
implications of star ratings for nursing homes. The combined data has 4433 records for California nursing
homes over the 5 years. The average profit per day per patient is calculated for nursing homes in each
overall rating group, as shown in Table 2-3. These averages serve as an estimate of the daily profit that a
nursing home can expect per resident for the corresponding overall rating. The difference is significant.
For example, a nursing home that receives 3 stars in health inspection may only expect a $10.79 profit
from treating one patient for one day. However, if it gains two additional stars after self-reporting and
achieves an overall rating of 5 stars, its expected profit increases to $19.8. Figure 2-3 shows the profit
trend for each of the star rating group over the 5 years.
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Table 2-3. Definition of Financial Incentive
Health
inspection
rating

Expected profit

a

Maximum
possible overall
rating

Maximum
expected profit

5
4

19.801
13.602

5
5

19.801
19.801

3

10.790

5

19.801

2

10.108

4

13.602

1

9.286

2

10.108

b

Financial Incentive

0
6.199 (Level
4)
9.011 (Level
3)
3.494 (Level
2)
0.822 (Level
1)

c

5– Level
5– Level
4– Level
2– Level

Notes :
a If inspection rating unchanged. The expected profit is the average per patient per day profit for the
corresponding star rating group.
b If maximu m possible overall rating realized.
c Difference between expected profit and expected loss .
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Figure 2-3. Profit Trend over the Period of 2009-2013
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5star

Nursing homes’ total net profits consist of healthcare part and non-healthcare part. The price of
healthcare related services is regulated by CMS’s Nursing Home Prospective Payment System (PPS)
(CMS, Prospective Payment Systems - General Information, 2015) (CMS, Skilled Nursing Facility
Prospective Payment System, 1997), which does not consider nursing homes’ star ratings. As a result,
highly rated nursing homes do not necessarily gain higher healthcare profits than the low-rating nursing
homes. The non-healthcare related services, however, are not regulated by CMS. Such services include
residential care services, unrestricted contributions, and interest income and gains from investments.
Historical data shows that highly rated nursing homes can attract more patients who are in good financial
conditions (typically self-paying and other resources). These patients are willing to pay more for good
quality non-healthcare services. As a result, the non-healthcare profits for high-rating nursing homes can
be significantly higher comparing with their low-rating counterparts. Moreover, the increased demand for
services that happens as a result of high star ratings (R. M. Werner, Konetzka, and Polsky 2016) can
reduce their overhead costs and thus lead to an increase in the net per-patient profit.

The results

demonstrate nursing homes’ incentives to achieve the highest possible ratings from the financial
perspective, and provide a quantifiable metric to measure such incentives. In our model, we define the
financial incentive of a nursing home to be the profit difference between its inspection rating and the
highest overall rating it could potentially obtain after self-reporting, as shown in Table 2-3. Note that the
financial incentive arises from the expectations in both profits and losses. It is possible for a nursing
home that has received 5 stars from the health inspection to lose two stars if it receives one star in the
self-reported domains. However, it is very unlikely that a nursing home with perfect health inspection
can be significantly under staffed or provides very poor quality of care. In our dataset, while 125 nursing
homes initially rated 3 stars in inspection gained two additional stars after self-reporting, only 4 nursing
homes initially rated five stars in inspection lost two stars after self-reporting.
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2.4.3 Empirical Model Specification
We focus on the change in the star rating that happens as a result of the self-reported measures. Our
dependent variable, StarChange, is equal to the difference between the overall rating and the health
inspection rating. For example, if the nursing home receives 3 stars from health inspection but receives a
5-star overall rating after including its self-reported measures on staffing and quality measure domains,
then the StarChange would be equal to two.
By definition, StarChange can only take discrete values of 2, 1, 0, -1 and -2, and thus we use an
ordinal logistic specification in which StarChange is modeled as a function of a vector of independent
variables. StarChange is determined by a set of parameters, α -2 , α-1 , α0 , α1 , which define the cutoff points
of the five levels. StarChange for nursing home i at year t can be modeled as follows
𝑃( 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑡  𝑗) =

exp(𝛼𝑗 +𝒙′𝒊𝒕𝜷)

(2.1)

1+exp(𝛼𝑗 +𝒙′𝒊𝒕𝜷)

where j ∈ {−2,−1,0,1} and x is a vector of the following independent variables: Incentive, BedCert,
OccuRate, MarketShare, HHI, ForProfit, Medicare, Medicaid, CouRes, CouFam, PctgMedicare,
PctgMedicaid, PctgSelfPay, PctgMGD, Chain.
Among the independent variables, the main effect we consider in our model is the nursing homes’
financial incentive, denoted by Incentive, and as shown in Table 2-3 varies depending on the inspection
rating of a nursing home. The capacity of each nursing home is measured by the number of certified bed,
and is denoted by variable BedCert. The occupancy of a nursing home is denoted by variable OccuRate,
OccuRate[0, 1]. Variables BedCert and OccuRate together, define the average number of residence of a
nursing home. Nursing homes are located in different areas, and may face different market conditions.
To capture local market features, we use variable MarketShare to denote the market share of each nursing
home in its local market, defined by Health Service Area (HSA). Based on market share, we also
calculate the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), which is widely used for capturing local market
competition, and included it in our empirical model.
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Variable ForProfit defines a nursing home’s

ownership type and is equal to one if the nursing home is for-profit and zero otherwise. Variables
Medicare and Medicaid define a nursing home’s certification. Medicare is equal to one if the nursing
home is Medicare certified, likewise, Medicaid is equal to one if the nursing home is Medicaid certified.
By law, nursing homes are required to allow councils set up by residents or their family members. These
councils facilitate the communication with staff and get problems resolved more efficient ly. Since nursing
home residents may be more vulnerable than normal people due to their health conditions, the residential
council and family council can function very differently in resolving issues and handling complaints. In
our model, binary variables ResCouncil and FamCouncil are included to respectively, denote the council
types as residential and family. A nursing home can have both types of councils. The OSHPD data
categorize nursing home payers into five categories: Medicare, Medicaid, Self-Pay, Managed Care, and
Others. To capture the impact of different payer percentage on nursing homes’ star rating changes, we
incorporate the percentage of each type of payers.

Four variables, PctgMedicare, PctgMedicaid,

PctgSelfPay, PctgMGD are added to denote the percentage of Medicare payers, Mediaid payers, Selfpaying payers, and Managed care payers. The percentage of other type payers are excluded due to
multicollinearity. In the nursing home industry, a certain amount of nursing homes is running under some
chains. Comparing with nursing homes working as separate facilities, nursing homes in chains may have
different operational rules and self-reporting behaviors. In our pooled California data, we have over 1500
records of nursing homes in a chain, and there are totally 101 distinct chains. As a result, we do not have
sufficient observations for each of the chains to conduct a fixed effect analysis. Rather than adding a
chain-level fixed effect, we regroup the nursing homes and add binary variable chain, which equals 1 if
the nursing home is operating in a chain and 0 the nursing home is operating separately. Table 2-4
provides the summary statistics of all variables in our model.
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Table 2-4. Variable Summary Statistics
Variable

Mean

Standard Deviation

Minimum

Maximum

Incentive

4.497

3.201

0

9.011

BedCert

101.964

49.579

19

391

OccuRate

0.874

0.172

0.0497

1

ForProfit

0.891

0.292

0

1

Chain

0.767

0.423

0

1

Medicare

0.963

0.188

0

1

Medicaid

0.965

0.183

0

1

CouRes

0.979

0.143

0

1

CouFam

0.230

0.421

0

1

MarketShare

0.0165

0.0159

0.000277

0.125

HHI

5.249

11.271

0.000765

156.314

PctgMedicare

0.154

0.127

0

0.921

PctgMedicaid

0.647

0.235

0

1

PctgSelfPay

0.0838

0.129

0

1

PctgMGD

0.663

0.103

0

0.999
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2.4.4 Estimation Results
We estimate equation (2.1) by different methods, as shown in Table 2-5. The first column shows the
estimation results for the pooled data. To deal with potential endogeneity, we take nursing homes’ fixed
effects into account and run a panel data regression which its estimates are shown in the second column.
Some of the variables in our model are time-invariant. For example, if a nursing home is Medicare
certified in year 1, it will most likely remain Medicare certified throughout the following years. As a
result, we cannot estimate their coefficients directly through the fixed-effect method. To obtain the
coefficients of these time-invariant variables, we implement Hausman-Taylor method, as shown in the
third column. In the estimates from all methods, the main effect Incentive is positive and statistically
significant, which indicates that nursing homes with higher financial incentives are more likely to
improve their star ratings after self-reporting. In all the three models, we observe negative significant
coefficients for variable chain, indicating that for nursing homes operating in chains, their star rating
increases are less likely to be driven by their financial incentives.

32

Table 2-5. Estimates of Equation (2.1)
Variables
Incentive
BedCert
OccuRate
ForProfit
Chain
Medicare
Medicaid
CouRes
CouFam
MarketShare
HHI
PctgMedicare
PctgMedicaid
PctgSelfPay
PctgMGD

Pooled data
0.0325***
(0.0906)
0.000284
(0.000655)
-0.584***
(0.166)
-0.0128
(0.112)
-0.269***
(0.0698)
-0.805***
(0.170)
-0.622***
(0.184)
-0.231
(0.202)
-0.279***
(0.0693)
-6.79
(4.49)
0.020***
(0.00614)
-2.283***
(0.339)
-0.771***
(0.254)
-0.861***
(0.321)
-0.446
(0.369)

Fixed effect
0.074***
(0.0144)
0.627
(0.560)
0.0265
(0.247)
-71.073*
(34.363)
0.0777*
(0.0343)
4.280***
(1.290)
1.610
(1.090)
-4.851***
(1.063)
6.291***
(1.207)
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Hausman-Taylor
0.074***
(0.0143)
0.00162
(0.00207)
0.445
(0.468)
-1.578***
(0.332)
-0.444**
(0.148)
-2.684***
(0.472)
-1.323*
(0.595)
-0.293
(0.536)
-0.315
(0.174)
-60.348*
(28.568)
0.0781*
(0.0339)
4.242***
(1.269)
1.819
(1.080)
-4.447***
(1.042)
6.386***
(1.198)

2.4.5 Alternative Incentive Definition
In the above section, we define the financial incentive of nursing homes based on the average per patient
daily profit over the 5-year period. The financial incentive, however, may vary over the years. For
example, the difference in the average per patient daily profit between 3-star nursing homes and 5-star
nursing homes in year t+1 may be bigger than that in year t. To capture this change over the years and to
test the robustness of our result, we propose an alternative incentive definition in this section. Instead of
looking at a 5-year average level, we instead use the per patient daily profit difference of the year t to
define nursing homes’ financial incentive of year t+1. Table 2-6 lists the new financial incentive under
the new definition. Table 2-7 then gives the regression results under the alternative financial incentive
definition. Similar to the discussion in the previous section, we also run three models: the pooled data
model, fixed effect model and Hausman Tylor model. In all the three models, the main effect financial
incentive is positive significant, which demonstrates the robustness of our results.
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Table 2-6. Alternative Definition of Financial Incentive
Health inspection
rating

2010 Financial
Incentive

2011 Financial
Incentive

2012 Financial
Incentive

2013 Financial
Incentive

5
4
3
2
1

0
0
0
2.129
0

0
0
0.687
3.525
1.126

0
0.38
3.399
3.97
1.447

0
3.655
5.183
2.858
0.937

Notes :
The financial incentive of year t is defined by using the year t-1 data. Since the panel we collected is fro m
2009-2013, we have no data to define incentives for year 2009, and the year 2013 data (wh ich should be
used for 2014 according to the definition) is not used in this definition.
In early years (2009 and 2010), there is no significant difference in per patient daily profit for some of the
rating levels, thus the financial incentive for improving star rating is defined as 0.
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Table 2-7. Estimates of Equation (2.1) based on the Alternative Financial Incentive Definition
Variables
Incentive
BedCert
OccuRate
ForProfit
Chain
Medicare
Medicaid
CouRes
CouFam
MarketShare
HHI
PctgMedicare
PctgMedicaid
PctgSelfPay
PctgMGD

Pooled data
0.323***
(0.0202)
-0.000111
(0.000733)
-0.515**
(0.190)
-0.0384
(0.126)
-0.288***
(0.790)
-0.900***
(0.189)
-0.461*
(0.203)
-0.273
(0.227)
-0.214**
(0.0777)
-8.128
(5.101)
0.0218**
(0.00706)
-2.189***
(0.375)
-0.862**
(0.282)
-0.377
(0.364)
-0.563
(0.406)

Fixed effect
0.412***
(0.0253)
0.050
(0.625)
-0.336
(0.265)
-5.752
(39.159)
0.0308
(0.0392)
0.644
(1.574)
1.241
(1.264)
-2.206
(1.281)
3.397*
(1.357)
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Hausman-Taylor
0.412***
(0.0252)
-0.000531
(0.00210)
0.257
(0.517)
-0.907**
(0.352)
-0.522***
(0.148)
-2.119***
(0.486)
-1.309*
(0.623)
-0.244
(0.495)
-0.142
(0.166)
-19.306
(32.179)
0.0344
(0.0388)
0.828
(1.551)
1.312
(1.254)
-1.990
(1.248)
3.481**
(1.350)

2.5. Inflation Detection and Demonstration
2.5.1 Correlation Analysis
Although the preliminary results show a positive association between the financial incentive and the
changes in the star-rating, they do not necessarily indicate inflation in self-reported measures. It is
possible that nursing homes gain the additional stars legitimately through their true efforts. To explore
the underlying reasons for the changes in ratings, we investigate the correlation between the health
inspections and self-reported domains. As illustrated in Figure 2-4, under the assumption that there is no
inflation and nursing homes self-reported measures are legitimate, positive correlations are expected
between two sets of ratings. First, within the same year, a positive correlation is expected between the star
ratings from CMS health inspection and those of nursing homes’ self-reported domains. Second, if a
nursing home really puts an effort in improving its care quality, these efforts should have a lasting effect
and lead to better results in the next year’s health inspections and thus there should be a positive
correlation between the star ratings from self-reported domains in one year and health inspection ratings
in the subsequent year.
Figure 2-5 shows the two sets of correlations as described above. It can be seen that within the
same year, the correlation between Health Inspection and Staffing is only 0.083, while the correlation
between Health Inspection and Quality Measures is 0.153. The result clearly indicates inconsistency
between the health inspections and self-reported domains within the same year. For the two consecutive
years, the correlation between Staffing and the Health Inspection in the following year is -0.094, and the
correlation between Quality Measures and the Health Inspection in the following year is 0.078. The result
indicates that the self-reported improvements in quality measure and staffing domains have no lasting
effect on the next year’s health inspection results at all. The correlation analysis serves as a preliminary
evidence of potential inflation, and triggers our further analysis.
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Figure 2-4. Graphical Representation of Correlation Analysis

Note: If star increase is resulted fro m legitimate efforts, then a positive co rrelation is expected between
self-reported measures in year 1 and on-site inspections in year 2 (red arro w). A positive correlat ion is also
expected between the self-reported measures and the on-site inspection ratings in the same year (green
arrow).
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Figure 2-5. Correlation Analysis for 5 Consecutive Years 2009-2013
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For the 5-year period we analyzed, it appears that the correlation between Health Inspection and
Quality Measures is higher. One interpretation is that the inflation on the Staffing is relatively easier than
that of Quality Measures during this period. We do notice that CMS is gradually releasing amendment on
the nursing home rating system, and one important policy is to require all nursing homes to report payroll related staffing data since the beginning of 2017. This shows that the inflation o n staffing level is
also one of the major concerns of CMS, and once payroll related staffing data is reported, the Staffing
measure will become more difficult to be inflated.
2.5.2 Complaint-based Analysis
In this section, we conduct further analysis to justify the existence of rating inflation. We identify a
quantifiable third-party proxy variable which can serve as an independent measure of service quality, and
compare the results with the star ratings given by the rating system. If significant inconsistency exists
between the two, then the star ratings are questionable, and rating inflation likely exists. In our method,
we use the number of complaints, which has been used as a common measure of the service quality in the
literature of service and complaint management in many service industries (E. Anderson, Claes, and
Roland 1997; Gardner 2004; Johnson 2001; Roland and Chung 2006). Specifically, we conduct an
analysis based on the CDPH complaint data which is independently collected data set of patient
complaints of California nursing homes. The combined CMS, OSHPD and CDPH dataset has 3850
records of California nursing homes over the 5 years.
If inflation does not exist, then the overall rating should be consistent with the true service quality,
which is reflected by the number of complaints. That is, for nursing homes with the same overall rating,
we expect them to have similar service qualities and similar number of complaints. Table 2-8 (a) shows
the average number of complaints for nursing homes with different health inspection and overall ratings.
In view that larger nursing homes with more patients may get more complaints, we normalized the
number of complaints by the size of a nursing home. The normalized results are presented in Table 2-8
(b).
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Table 2-8. Average Number of Patient Complaints

Inspection
stars

(a) Original Complaints

1
2
3
4
5

1
7.981
6.193
3.929

2
6.989
6.271
3.934
3.923

Overall star rating
3

4

5

6.010
4.633
3.799
6.667

8.389
4.940
3.503
2.157

4.056
2.826
2.423

Inspection
stars

(b) Normalized Complaints (size=100)

1
2
3
4
5

1
6.505
5.946
4.366

2
6.909
5.687
4.676
4.218

Overall star rating
3

4

5

6.210
4.860
4.459
9.473

8.251
5.597
4.157
2.517

4.288
3.547
2.921

Note: a The blank cells represent the impossible rat ing transaction according to
CMS’s rating system design .
b The

shaded cells represent nursing homes of which the ratings increased after
self-reporting. The inflators are among these nursing homes. We denote the
shaded and unshaded areas as Area I and Area II, respectively.
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For each overall rating level, the nursing homes are divided into two categories: Nursing homes
whose star ratings increased after self-reporting and nursing homes whose star ratings did not increase
after self-reporting. We denote the upper triangular section as area I (shaded) and lower triangular section
as area II. The shaded area (I) includes those nursing homes whose overall rating has increased as a result
of their self-reported measures. Area II includes those nursing homes whose overall rating either
decreased or remained the same after self-reporting. This classification allows us to test the following
claims:
Claim 1: If the improvements observed are not resulted from legitimate efforts and inflation does
exist, nursing homes with the same overall star rating but different health inspection ratings
should have different complaint distributions.
The results of two ANOVA tests are presented in Table 2-9 (a). In the first column, nursing
homes with the same overall ratings are grouped by whether or not their star rating increased after selfreporting. In other words, we examine if the shaded and unshaded cells in each column of Table 2-8 have
similar distributions. In the second column, we group nursing homes with the same overall rating based
on their health inspection ratings. In other words, we examine if all the cells in each column of Table 2-8
have similar distributions. As reported in Table 2-9 (a), all the comparisons are significant and thus the
claim that nursing homes with the same overall rating but different inspection ratings have different
complaint distributions is supported. The ANOVA test results for the normalized complaints are reported
in Table 2-9 (b), which are similar to the results in Table 2-9 (a) and support our conclusion.
Claim 2: If the improvements observed are not resulted from legitimate efforts and inflation does
exist, nursing homes with the same inspection rating but different overall ratings should have
similar complaint distributions.
The results of two ANOVA tests are presented in Table 2-10 (a). In the first column, nursing
homes with the same health inspection ratings are grouped by whether or not their star rating increased
after self-reporting. In other words, we examine if the shaded and unshaded cells in each row of Table 2-8
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have similar distributions. In the second column, we group nursing homes with the same inspection rating
based on their overall star ratings. In other words, we examine if all the cells in each row of Table 2-8
have similar distributions. As shown in Table 2-10 (a), we do not observe a significant difference in the
number of complaints, although the overall rating can be quite different. The results show that service
quality does not improve for nursing homes whose star ratings get improved after self-reporting and thus
Claim 2 is also supported. Together with the results obtained for Claim 1, the analysis provides strong
evidence of the existence of rating inflation in self-reported measures. The ANOVA test results for the
normalized complaints are reported in Table 2-10 (b), which also support our conclusion.
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Table 2-9. F Statistics: Comparison in Each Overall Rating a) Original Complaints b) Normalized
Complaints (size=100)

Overall
star rating

(a) F Statistics

1
2
3
4
5

Grouped by Area I
vs Area II
7.43***
13.05***
14.22***
5.27**

Grouped by
inspection ratings
4.61**
6.16***
5.06***
8.35***
5.70***

Overall
star rating

(b) F Statistics

1
2
3
4
5

Grouped by Area I
vs Area II
7.77**
7.2**
10.15**
3.92*

44

Grouped by
inspection ratings
0.94
3.25*
2.88*
5.33**
2.64

Table 2-10. F Statistics: Comparison in Each Inspection Rating a) Original Complaints b)
Normalized Complaints (size=100)

Inspection
ratings

(a) F Statistics

1
2
3
4
5

Grouped by Area I
vs Area II
2.46
0.12
0.78
5.37**
-

Grouped by overall
ratings
2.46
0.12
0.78
2.00
1.91

Inspection
ratings

(b) F Statistics

1
2
3
4
5

Grouped by Area I
vs Area II
0.5
1.6
0.99
2.51
-
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Grouped by overall
ratings
0.5
1.46
0.77
0.95
3.3*

2.6. Prediction Model and Variable Importance Analysis
In this section, we first develop a method which gives a quantifiable estimate of the extensiveness of
rating inflation. We then run a variable importance analysis to summarize key characteristics of the likely
inflators.
For nursing home that inflates its self-reported measures, the overall rating is driven by two
components. The first component is the observable characteristics which are common between c heating
and honest nursing homes. The second component is the unobservable inflation coefficient which only
pertains to the inflating nursing homes. If we model the overall ratings as a function of observed
characteristics, the inflation component is unobserved and omitted from our regression model, thus the
estimates of the remaining observed variables will suffer from the omitted variable bias. However, since
the overall star ratings of honest nursing homes are only driven by one component of observed
characteristics and the inflation component does not exist among the honest nursing homes, our
regression estimates for the honest group will not suffer from the omitted variable bias. To develop our
inflation prediction model, we first divide the nursing homes into two groups: the honest nursing homes
and the remaining, defined as potential inflators. A regression is then run for the honest nursing homes.
The obtained regression coefficients from the sample of honest nursing homes are unbiased and reflect
the true associations without inflation. These unbiased coefficients are then used to predict the highest
possible overall star rating for each nursing home in the suspected inflating group. A nursing home is
identified as a likely inflator in our estimation if its actual overall rating is higher than the highest level of
its predicted overall rating.
2.6.1 Prediction Model
In our model, the overall star rating is used as the dependent variable, denoted by OverallRating. Similar
to the variable StarChange in the regression model in Section II, OverallRating is ordinal and takes
values in five levels {1,2,…,5} so we employ an ordinal logistic regression model. OverallRating is
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determined by a set of parameters γ 1 , γ2 , γ3 , γ4 , which define the cut points of the five star levels. The
model can be written as
𝑃(𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔  𝑘) =

exp(𝛾𝑘+𝒙′𝜷𝑷 )
,
1+exp( 𝛾𝑘+𝒙′𝜷𝑷 )

(2.2)

where k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. The independent variables denoted by vector x are the same as the ones used in
equation (2.1). The coefficients of prediction model are denoted by 𝜷𝑷 .
Since we use the coefficients of the honest group as the unbiased baseline, we define the
members in this group very strictly to guarantee that there is no evidence of inflation for all nursing
homes in the honest group. An honest nursing home is selected based on the following criteria:
1. Its overall star rating does not increase after self-reporting.
2. The number of its patient complaints is strictly lower than the median of its corresponding self reporting level.
Our logic for selecting the honest nursing homes is as follows: We divide the inflators into two
different types. The first type consists of nursing homes which inflate their self-reported measures to
achieve higher ratings. For these inflators to be identified, a necessary condition is that they gain
additional stars after self-reporting (there can be honest nursing homes who gain the additional stars
through legitimate efforts though). In our first criterion, we excluded all the nursing homes whose star
rating increased after self-reporting, thus we completely excluded any inflators of this type. The second
type of inflators consists of nursing homes which inflate their self-reported measures to avoid losing stars.
These nursing homes may have low Staffing or low Quality Measures that may lead to decreased overall
ratings. In our second criterion, we excluded nursing homes whose number of complaints are above the
median of its rating level. By using these two criteria, we excluded nursing homes who may lose stars
due to their poor services, and guaranteed that the remaining nursing homes deserve staying in that rating
level.
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Based on the two criteria, we identify the honest (H) group, which consists of 1262 nursing home
records in 5 years. The remaining 2588 nursing home records are categorized in the potential inflator (PI)
group. Note that the PI group consists of both the actual inflators and the nursing homes who improve
their service qualities through legitimate efforts. In the following, we estimate the proportion of the actual
inflators in the PI population.
We run the ordinal logistic regression in equation (2.2) on the sample of honest nursing homes (H
group) to obtain the unbiased estimates of each coefficient. The regression results for the honest group is
reported in Table 2-11. Both the 95% and 90% confidence interval are calculated. Using the upper
bounds of unbiased coefficient estimates, we then predict the highest possible rating for each of the
nursing homes in the PI group. A nursing home is classified as an inflator if its actual overall star rating is
higher than the highest possible rating predicted through our model. Based on the 95% confidence
interval, we can identify 147 inflator records out of the 2588 nursing home records (5.68%) in the PI
group. Based on 90% confidence interval, we can identify 219 inflator records (8.46%) in the PI group.
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Table 2-11. Estimates of the Honest Group
Variables
Incentive

Coefficients
0.102***
(0.0184)
-0.0115***
(0.00125)
0.863**
(0.300)
-1.491***
(0.208)
-0.430***
(0.130)
-2.853***
(0.563)
-1.580***
(0.408)
-0.613
(0.420)
0.646***
(0.122)
2.234
(8.146)
0.00889
(0.0116)
-0.330
(0.758)
-0.0678
(0.626)
1.582*
(0.718)
-2.551***
(0.793)

BedCert
OccuRate
ForProfit
Chain
Medicare
Medicaid
CouRes
CouFam
MarketShare
HHI
PctgMedicare
PctgMedicaid
PctgSelfPay
PctgMGD
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2.6.2 Variable Importance Analysis
It is important to understand the key differences between honest nursing homes and the inflators, so that
we can focus on these differences in audits and identify the inflators efficiently. In this section, a variable
importance analysis is conducted to explore the key characteristics of the inflators. A subset of the data is
first constructed by eliminating nursing homes whose status cannot be identified. The eliminated nursing
homes are the ones which are neither identified as likely inflators nor identified as honest ones. The
remaining dataset consists of 1481 nursing home records, in which 1262 records are for honest nursing
homes and 219 records are for the likely inflators identified using a 90% confidence interval. The status
of a nursing home is assigned as 0 if it belongs to honest group and 1 if it is a likely inflator. To perform
the variable importance analysis, we use the logistic specification presented in equation (2.3).
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝜆) = 𝒙′𝜷

(2.3)

where 𝜆 is the probability of being identified as an inflator, x is the vector of variables that were also used
in equations (2.1) and (2.2).
The variable importance analysis results are presented in Table 2-12. Among the variables, we
find the variable BedCert to be the top in terms of variable importance. The result indicates that when a
nursing home’s size grows, its probability to game the rating system increases significantly.

The

percentage of self-paying is also a key variable contributing to being an inflator. As discussed earlier in
the incentive definition section, self-paying patients are typically good in financial situations and they
contribute significantly to nursing homes’ non-healthcare profits. Since non-healthcare pricing is not
regulated by CMS, highly rated nursing homes typically charge much higher prices on non-healthcare
services than low-rating nursing homes. It is reasonable to believe that many nursing homes with high
percentage of self-paying patients are inflating their self-reported measures in order to gain more nonhealthcare profits. The results also indicate that nursing homes with family type councils are more likely
to be inflators. Another variable Chain also has a very high importance. Note that in section 4, our
results suggest that nursing homes in chains are less likely to be driven by their financial incentives to

50

improve star ratings. One possible explanation for these results is that nursing homes in these franchises
follow chain-level decisions for self-reporting, which are less sensitive to individual nursing home’s
financial incentive. It is possible for some chains to inflate self-reported measures throughout their
facilities. Besides the variables discussed above, Incentive and ForProfit are also important factors for
being an inflator. For-profits nursing homes are more likely to inflate their self-reported ratings than the
non-profits ones, and the higher their financial incentives are, the more likely they will be inflators. This
result is consistent with the work of Chesteen et al. (2005). The probability of being an inflator, on the
other hand, is less likely to be affected by market competition (e.g., HHI, Market Share) and certification
status (Medicare, Pctg_Medicare, Medicaid, Pctg_Medicaid, etc.).
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Table 2-12. Variable Importance Analysis
Variables
BedCert
Pctg_SelfPay
Cou_Fam
Chain
Incentive
Occu_Rate
ForProfit
HHI
MarketShare
Pctg_MGD
Medicaid
Pctg_Medicaid
Cou_Res
Pctg_Medicare
Medicaid

Variable Importance
0.405
0.288
0.274
0.264
0.254
0.194
0.182
0.176
0.171
0.122
0.109
0.097
0.066
0.043
0.041
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2.7. Conclusion
This chapter systematically analyzes CMS’s nursing home rating system, demonstrates the existence of
inflation, and presents a model to detect likely inflators. We show that nursing homes have strong
financial incentives directly related to higher star ratings, which may in turn drive the inflating behaviors.
We then develop a systematical method which uses independent third-party measure of patient complaints
to demonstrate the existence of rating inflation. An inflation prediction model is then developed, which
provides an estimate of the proportion of inflating nursing homes in the current system, and gives a
quantifiable evaluation of the system performance. The variable importance analysis is then performed to
identify the factors that contribute the most to being an inflator.
Our research provides several contributions. First, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first
study that systematically investigates the inflation in the CMS nursing home rating system. It explores the
fundamental financial reason for a nursing home to improve the star rating, even by inflating self-reported
measures, which links the dots between incentives and observed behavior. Second, we contrib ute to the
theory by developing this systematical method for demonstrating the existence of rating inflation and
evaluating inflator proportion. As we discussed earlier, although CMS has implemented minor
improvements to its rating system, it is still largely based on self-reported measures and does not address
the issue of inflation. Our research demonstrates the shortcoming of the rating system and informs CMS
on how to improve its system or how to identify the likely inflators. This study estimates the proportion of
likely inflators and summarizes their key characteristics. The results can be used to strategically focus the
future audits on the nursing homes which are most likely to be inflators, and help CMS improve the rating
system.
This work also has several limitations. First, we are unable to measure the financial incentives for
each nursing home at the individual level. This is practically very difficult, since even for the same
nursing home at the same rating level, the financial incentive may vary over time depending on various
financial situations. To address this limitation, we perform our analysis on an aggregated level and use the
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average as a universal incentive for each rating group, leaving the unobserved incentive fluctuations to the
nursing homes fixed effects. Second, we do not observe self-reporting inflation directly and can only
infer it from an aggregated level. This is a common issue in misbehavior detection research due to the
unavailability of individual-level data. We address this limitation by calculating the highest possible
rating using the confidence interval and using the most conservative statistics. Third, we are only able to
measure patient complaints in numbers, but not in “severeness”. For example, a complaint on medical
malpractice may have much more impact than a complaint on sanity. Future research can apply text
mining techniques to address this limitation.
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Chapter 3. Catching Them Red-handed: Optimizing the Nursing Homes’
Rating System
3.1 Introduction
Nursing homes constitute an important segment of the U.S. healthcare system. They provide care to 1.5
million patients in America (Fowles et al. 2012). Medicare annually spends more than $49 billion on the
services provided in nearly 16,000 nursing homes in the United States (KFF, 2012). The medical, social
and economic importance of nursing homes led the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) to
design and implement a rating system for these facilities in 2008. Given the lack of alternative
information resources, this publicly available rating system has become the gold standard in the industry
and widely popular among patients, physicians and payers (Thomas 2014).
In this rating system, CMS rates each nursing home in a 5-star scale based on its performance in
three domains: Health Inspections, Staffing and Quality Measures. The health inspections are conducted
by CMS-certified inspectors, while the other two domains are self-reported by nursing homes. To rate a
nursing home, CMS first conducts an on-site inspection that determines an initial rating. The nursing
home will then self-report measures of its quality and staffing which can add or subtract up to two stars to
or from its initial on-site rating (CMS 2015). The two self-reported measures can significantly affect a
nursing home’s overall ratings; for example, a nursing home that initially received three stars from the onsite inspection can increase its overall ratings to five stars if it self-reports excellent measures on its
quality and staffing. Prior research shows that between six to twelve percent of the nursing homes inflate
their self-reported measures as a strategy to gain higher overall star ratings (Han et al. 2016).
CMS has limited resources and inevitably has to partially rely on self-reported measures to
evaluate nursing homes. This requires (1) an inspection strategy to determine the domain to be inspected
directly by CMS and (2) an audit strategy to detect and deter fraud in the self-reported measures of the
domains that are not directly inspected by CMS. This research, as we describe below, seeks to optimize
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the inspection strategy and design an audit system for CMS to improve its current nursing homes’ rating
system.
Currently, CMS only inspects the Health Inspection domain as one of the three domains. It is not
yet known if inspecting this domain is the optimal strategy. In this research, we examine other domains
which CMS can conduct inspection on in order to either minimize the percentage of nursing homes that
inflate their self-reported measures or minimize the difficulty of detecting the ones that engage in such
behavior.
When it comes to self-reporting, a typical practice is to design an audit system to detect and deter
fraud. A well-known example is the audit system implemented by Internal Revenue Service (IRS), which
is shown to significantly reduce the degree of income tax evasion in the US (Cebula 2012). Despite these
potential benefits, CMS currently does not have any audit system in place. To bridge this gap, we design
an effective audit system for CMS to control inflation. In our design, CMS randomly audits a portion of
nursing homes which have gained additional stars through self-reporting, and fines the caught inflators
according to a pre-announced rate. CMS adds the collected penalties to its budget which funds more
audits within the same year. Under this audit mechanism, the reaction of the nursing homes that do not
inflate is different from those that do. In other words, although the honest nursing homes’ reporting
behaviors are not affected by CMS’s audit policy, the inflators, on the other hand, will decide how much
to inflate their self-reported measures based on their expected profits under different CMS auditing
policies.
This chapter presents major insights for improving the inspection system and designing an audit
strategy. We develop a novel graph-based model and optimize the selection of inspection domains by
minimizing the percentage of nursing homes that can inflate their self-reported measures or minimizing
the difficulty of detecting the ones that engaged in such behavior. Our results indicate that the domain
that CMS is currently inspecting is optimal in term of minimizing the difficulty to detect inflators. We
develop conditions on the audit parameter settings and justify our findings through simulation. Our
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results indicate that CMS should apply a moderate audit policy in order to balance the tradeoff between
the audit’s net budget and its efficiency.
The findings of this research have implications for other rating systems with similar features. For
example, mandated by the Medicare Access & CHIP Reauthorization Act (MACRA) of 2015, CMS has
to calculate a performance score for clinicians in the US based on a similar composition of inspected and
self-reported measures. Similar to the nursing homes’ star rating, the clinicians’ performance score, which
is the basis of Medicare payments to physicians, suffers from the shortcomings that we discussed earlier.
As a result, our findings about optimal inspection domain selection and audit strategy design also apply in
this context.
The chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 3.2, we review the related literature on audit systems
to detect and deter fraudulent behavior. In Section 3.3, we use a novel graph-based model to formulate the
inspection strategy and convert it into a linear optimization problem. We use the publicly available data
from CMS to optimize our model and select the inspection domain based on the two objectives of
minimizing the percentage of nursing homes that can inflate, and minimizing the difficulty for detecting
inflators. In Section 3.4 we design the audit strategy. We consider nursing homes’ reaction to different
audit policies, and derive conditions on the parameter settings of the audit. We then conduct a simulation
of the audit process to examine our analytical results. Finally, Section 3.5 concludes the chapter.

3.2 Literature Review
Researchers have developed various methods to detect fraud across a wide variety of disciplines from
finance and management to sports and academia (Abbasi et al. 2012, Abbasi etal. 2015, Wright et al. 2010,
Cecchini et al. 2010, Mayzlin et al. 2012, Duggan et al. 2000, Bai et al. 2010, Jocob et al. 2003). The
fundamental approach of all fraud detection methods is to pinpoint “abnormal patterns” embedded in the
data. We divide these methods into different streams based on the methods used to identify such
uncommon patterns.
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The first stream of research constitutes of studies that apply “majority rule” to detect abnormal
patterns. In this method, researchers first determine the behavior of the majority of the population as the
baseline and then identify unusual behaviors by comparing individuals’ behaviors with the majority’s
baseline. Josang et al. (2002) and Ma et al. (2013) develop a mechanism to detect fake ratings in which a
rater is considered dishonest on evaluating an entity, if the evaluation score from all other raters falls in
the rejection area of this rater’s beta distribution rejection region. Jindal and Liu (2008) build a logistic
regression model using a collection of rating features to distinguish fake ratings. Lim et al. (2010)
proposes a scoring method to measure the degree of spam for each reviewer to identify fake ratings, and
apply the method on an Amazon review dataset. Wang et al. (2011) uses a graphical method to analyze
the relationship among raters, ratings and entities.

Mukherjee et al. (2013) designs a rating fraud

detection model which identifies fake ratings by calculating their deviation from the majority. The above
studies rely on the majority rule for fraud detection and the assumption that the population provides a
consistent evaluation of a certain subject. This assumption does not always hold true, especially in cases
where the population by nature has diversified opinion about the same subject.
In the second stream, researchers focus on to the unusual and abrupt changes in certain indicators
to identify fraud. DellaVigna et al. (2010) proposes a method to detect illegal arms trade between
countries under embargo using the weapon manufacturers’ stock prices as a proxy and analyzing their
fluctuations as turmoil and conflicts arise at certain geographical areas. Liu et al. (2010) proposes a
method to detect malicious fake ratings based on overall rating as an indicator. When a large amount of
fake ratings is submitted over a short period, the overall rating will show unusual sudden change.
In the third stream, researchers compare suspicious behaviors with formerly known honest peers
to detect fraud. Dellarocas (2000) detect suspicious ratings using the previously identified honest ratings
as a filter to explore dissimilarities. Teacy et al. (2006) evaluates the trustworthiness of a rater by
comparing her ratings with the other previously identified honest raters. Liu et al. (2014) utilizes
difference between local and global ratings to identify fake ratings. Han et al. (2015) develop a method
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which first identifies honest nursing homes according to a set of restrictive criteria, and then builds a
prediction model based on the identified honest nursing homes to detect inflators.
The methodologies discussed above cannot be directly applied by CMS to detect fraudulent selfreporting in the nursing homes’ rating system. First, nursing homes are located at various locations, with
different market environments and types of patients. As a result, the patients’ ratings can be very much
diversified, even though they may have received similar services. For example, some issues may only be
important for certain groups of patients but not others. In such cases, each type of opinion can be truthreflecting, and therefore the majority rule does not apply. Second, the self-reported measures have been
used for years without being audited, thus the rating patterns over the year, though probably inflated, can
be very consistent. Consequently, it is difficult to identify any “sudden change” in the patterns of selfreported measures. Third, the above methods usually require data on the characteristics of those who are
more likely to commit fraud. However, there is currently no audit system to catch the inflators, and it is
very difficult to identify the characteristics of the inflating nursing homes. Fraud detection methods are
usually problem-dependent, and to the best of our knowledge, few effective fraud detection methods for
the nursing home rating system have been reported in the existing literature.
Recent studies on the CMS nursing home rating system shed light on this nursing home selfreporting inflation problem.

Han et al. (2015) collect CMS rating data over 2009-2013 and the

corresponding financial data reported by Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development (OSHPD)
and patients’ complaints data reported by California Department of Public Health (CDPH) for 1219
nursing homes in California to empirically examine the key factors that affect the changes in the star
rating of a nursing home. The results indicate a significant positive association between the change in
nursing homes’ star ratings and their financial incentives. It is also demonstrated that the improvement in
ratings cannot be explained by nursing homes’ legitimate efforts to improve their service qualities. A
prediction model is developed to evaluate the extent of inflation among the nursing homes which
identifies 6% to 12.5% nursing homes to be likely inflators in the current system. The results provide
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important guidelines on evaluating parameters in the nursing home rating system, such as nursing homes’
financial conditions and nursing home population in each rating level. In this chapter, we first set up a
model to identify the domain which CMS should inspect in order to eliminate the possibility of inflation,
then look into the design of audit system.

3.3 Inspection Strategy
Without proper monitoring in the self-reporting process, nursing homes have significant incentives to
report inflated measures to CMS in order to achieve higher overall star ratings. Such biased ratings will
not only mislead those who rely on this information to make medical decisions, but will also undermine
the truthful nursing home that pursue genuine efforts to improve their ratings. The selection of inspection
domain determines which domains are left self-reported, and has prolonged effect on the reliability of
CMS’s ratings. Due to limited resources, CMS only inspects one of the three domains and has to rely on
nursing homes to self-report their performance in the other two domains. CMS could potentially divert its
resources to inspect other domains than the one that it currently does. That is, instead of conducting health
inspections, CMS could conduct inspections on quality measures or staffing levels. In this section, we
examine alternative inspection strategies under different objectives to identify which of the three domains
CMS should inspect in order to ensure that the percentage of nursing homes that can inflate their selfreported measures is minimized or the difficulty of detecting the ones that engaged in such behavior is
minimized. We assume that all nursing homes seek for the best possible rating they can achieve. This
implies that all nursing homes can inflate their ratings on domains that are not inspected. Since CMS
currently does not have an effective audit mechanism and inflating nursing homes are almost never
caught, this assumption can be viewed as the worst-case scenario. The assumption is relaxed when
nursing homes’ reaction for punishment is incorporated to design an audit strategy in the next section.
We formulate CMS’s inspection strategy in two models within a graph-based framework and then test our
models using CMS’s historical data.
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3.3.1 The Graph-based Framework
We undertake a graph-based approach to model the combination of the ratings of nursing homes’ in the
three domains and the potential of rating inflation. As shown in Figure 3-1, each node represents a
possible rating combination, and is depicted by (A, B, C) in which A, B and C represent the star rating in
each of the three domains of health, staffing and quality measures. As discussed earlier, the overall
ratings increase by one star only if the performance in either of the two self-reported domains is
equivalent to five stars. As a result, we can transform the five-star ratings into a 0-1 setting in which “1”
represents being rated 5 stars and “0” represents being rated four stars or less. Each node thus shows one
possible combination of the three measures. For example, node (000) shows the nursing homes that are
not rated five stars in any of the three measures. For each node, the corresponding probability of each
rating combination is listed in the parenthesis under it.
For each domain, a rating of five stars leads to one additional star in the overall ratings, and results in
moving from the current node to the corresponding node in the next level. Such moves are represented by
the arcs in Figure 3-1, which are indexed based on the combination of its origin and destination. For
example, arc 14 denotes the arc from node 1 to node 4, and indicates that nursing homes at node (000) can
have 5 stars in domain A and move to node (100). For any two nodes connected by an arc, the ratings on
only 1 domain changes. If a domain is selected for inspection, nursing homes cannot longer inflate their
ratings of that domain and the corresponding arcs will be removed. For example, if domain C is inspected,
nursing homes will not be able to move to the next rating level by inflating measure C, and therefore arcs
14, 25, 37 and 68 will be removed. An extreme case is for CMS to inspect all the three domains. In this
case, all the arcs are removed, and the nodes become isolated. In other words, no nursing home will be
able to inflate its star ratings. In the following, we formulate and solve the inspection problem with two
objective functions: minimizing the percentage of nursing homes that can inflate, and minimizing the
difficulty to detect inflators.

Table 3-1 shows all the notations and symbols used in the problem

formulation.
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Figure 3-1. The Graph-based Framework
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Figure 3-2. The Graph Topology

Suppose domain C is inspected, then arcs 14, 25, 37 and 68 will be removed. The graph is divided into
two sub-graphs, with node 6 and node 8 be the ending nodes for each sub-graph
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Table 3-1. Notations and Symbols used in the Inspection Problem
i, j

Node index

k

Inspection measure index

i

The percentage of nursing homes showing the rating combination associated with node i.  i  i
=1

xij

Arc connectivity variable for arc ij. xij =1 if node i and node j are connected by arc ij

yk

Inspection measure decision variable. yk=1 if measure k is selected for inspection

zi

Flow indicator variable for node i. zi =0 if no flow is coming out of node i

ck

The cost to inspect measure k

C

CMS’s total inspection budget

vij

Ending node indicator variable. vij =1 if node j is node i’s ending node, i.e., nursing homes at
node i, can increase their star ratings and move to node j.

pj

The probability of showing the rating combination associated with node j.  j p j =1

M

A big positive number used for linear conversion.
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3.3.2 Minimizing the Percentage of Nursing Homes That Can Inflate
In this formulation, we minimize the percentage of nursing homes that can inflate. That is, we minimize
the percentage of nursing homes that can move to higher rating nodes. Consider a problem with 𝐼 nodes
indexed by 𝑖 and 𝐾 domains indexed 𝑘. The percentage of nursing homes at node 𝑖 is denoted by 𝜋𝑖 ,
where 𝜋𝑖 can be estimated from CMS’s historical data such that ∑𝑖 𝜋𝑖 = 1. An arc connecting node 𝑖 to 𝑗
is denoted by 𝑥 𝑖𝑗 such that 𝑥 𝑖𝑗 = 1 iff the arc is connected. The domain which CMS inspects is denoted
by a binary variable 𝑦𝑘 where 𝑘 ∈ {𝐴, 𝐵, 𝐶 } and 𝑦𝑘 = 1 iff the measure is selected for inspection. For
each node, we introduce a binary indicator variable 𝑧𝑖 to denote whether arcs originate from it. Thus 𝑧𝑖 =
0, iff ∑𝑗 𝑥𝑖𝑗 = 0. In other words, at the nodes where 𝑧𝑖 = 0, the star ratings of a nursing home cannot
increase any more. The problem is to choose an inspection domain, such that the percentage of nursing
homes that can inflate their ratings is minimized.

s.t.

𝑚𝑖𝑛: ∑𝑖 𝜋𝑖 𝑧𝑖

(3.1)

Budget constraint: ∑𝑘 𝑦𝑘 𝑐𝑘 ≤ 𝐶,

(3.2)

Ending node constraint: 𝑧𝑖 = 1, 𝑖𝑓 ∑𝑗 𝑥 𝑖𝑗 ≠ 0,

(3.3)

Inspection constraint: 𝑥 𝑖𝑗 = 1 − 𝑦𝑘, 𝑥𝑖𝑗 ∈ 𝜑𝑘 ,

(3.4)

where 𝜑𝑘 is the set of arcs affected by CMS decision 𝑘.
Equation (3.1) denotes the total percentage of nursing homes that can inflate, which is the
objective of this model. Equation (3.2) represents the budget constraints of CMS, where 𝑐𝑘 is the cost for
inspecting measure 𝑘, and 𝐶 is the overall inspection budget. Equation (3.3) indicates whether there are
arcs originating from node i. In other words, if 𝑧𝑖 = 1 then nursing homes can still increase star ratings at
node i. If 𝑧𝑖 = 0, then nursing homes cannot improve star rating any more, and there is no arc originating
from the node and therefore ∑𝑗 𝑥𝑖𝑗 = 0. Equation (3.4) denotes the relationship between arcs 𝑥 𝑖𝑗 and the
inspection domain 𝑦𝑘. For each domain 𝑘, 𝜑𝑘 denotes the set of arcs which represent changes in the
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domain measures. For example, for domain A, arc 12, 36, 45, 78 represent the changes in measure of
domain A from nodes (000), (010), (001), and (011), respectively. If domain A is inspected, 𝑦𝐴 = 1, and
all the 𝑥 𝑖𝑗s for the 4 arcs will be set at 0.
The logic constraint in equation (3.3) can be converted to a linear constraint and replaced by the
following two constraints:
𝑀𝑧𝑖 ≥ ∑𝑗 𝑥𝑖𝑗,

(3.5)

𝑧𝑖 ≤ ∑𝑗 𝑥𝑖𝑗,

(3.6)

where M is a large number.
3.3.3 Minimizing the Difficulty of Detecting Inflators
The other objective of the inspection strategy is to facilitate the detection of fraud in the measures of the
domains which are left to nursing homes to self-report. That is, we intend to inspect a domain such that
inflating nursing homes, after inflating their scores in remaining uninspected domains, show some rare
patterns in their rating combination, which makes them easier to be detected. For example, suppose a
rating combination, say (001), is very common and occurs with a relatively high probability. If a n
inflating nursing homes achieves this rating combination after fraudulent self-reporting, it will not draw
CMS’s attention and its inflation of the scores will be difficult to be detected. On the other hand, if an
inflating nursing home achieves a rating combination with a relatively low probability which rarely
occurs, say (110), the case will be highly suspicious and relatively easier for CMS to detect.
In this formulation, we minimize the difficulty for detecting inflators. The difficulty is defined to
be the product of inflator population (denoted in percentage) and the probability of the rating combination
after self-reporting. The probability of showing rating combination 𝑗 is denoted by 𝑝𝑗 , and is estimated
from CMS’s historical data. For example, if measure 𝑘 is inspected, and 10% of inflators will show a
rating combination with probability of 0.2 after self-reporting, the difficulty to detect inflators when
measure 𝑘 is inspected is defined to be 0.10.2=0.02. Intuitively, we try to strategically change the
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topology of the graph, such that the inflators are redirected to show some rare rating combination after
self-reporting, and can be detected easily.
Following this logic, we formulate the model to minimize the total difficulty for detecting
inflators. Besides the variables introduced in Section 3.2, a new binary variable 𝑣𝑖𝑗 is defined for each
node pair, 𝑣𝑖𝑗 = 1, if 𝑗 is the ending node of 𝑖, and 0 otherwise. A flow equation (3.8) is thus added to the
set of constraints described in Section 3.2, and the problem formulation changes to
min ∑𝑖  𝑖 (∑𝑗 𝑝𝑗 𝑣𝑖𝑗 )

(3.7)

𝑦𝑘

s.t.

equations (3.2), (3.3), (3.4), and
𝑣𝑖𝑗 = 1, if node j is the ending node of node i, 𝑣𝑖𝑗 = {0, 1}.

(3.8)

Equation (3.8) defines the relationship between node pairs when different domains are inspected.
For example, v16 denotes whether nursing homes at node 1 will reach to node 6 after inflation. Suppose
domain C is selected for inspection, and arcs 14, 25, 37 and 68 are removed from the graph shown in
Figure 3-1, resulting in two unconnected sub-graphs shown in Figure 3-2. After inflating their selfreported scores, inflating nursing homes at node 1 will move to node 6, with rating combination (110),
thus node 6 is the ending node for node 1, and 𝑣16 = 1. However, 𝑣12 = 0, since inflators at node 1 will
not stop at node 2, but can further inflate to node 6 to achieve a 2-star improvement. In other words, node
2 is not an ending node. Also, 𝑣18 = 0, since when domain C is inspected, inflators at node 1 cannot
inflate their scores in domain C, and cannot reach node 8, and thus node 1 and node 8 are not connected.
According to the discussion above, we can decompose constraint (8) into two parts:
Part 1: Node 𝑗 is an ending node, with 𝑧𝑗 = 0
Part 2: Node 𝑗 and node 𝑖 are connected.
Part 1 can be expressed as
𝑣𝑖𝑗 ≤ 𝑧𝑗.

(3.9)
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To convert part 2 to a linear format, we define connections between two nodes by exploring all
the paths connecting them. For example, for node 1 and node 2 to be connected, 𝑥12 = 1 is necessary and
sufficient; For node 1 and node 5 to be connected, at least one of the two paths 125 or 145 must
be connected.

We define binary connection variable 𝑥125 such that 𝑥125 =1, iff path 125 is

connected, that is, 𝑥12 = 1 and 𝑥25 = 1. The binary variable 𝑥145 can be defined similarly. Table 3-2
lists the logical constraints needed for describing connection between any pair of the eight nodes shown in
Figure 3-1.
The logical constraints are then systematically converted to linear forms. Take connection 𝑥15 as
an example. Equation (3.10) and (3.11) guarantee that 𝑥15 = 1, if at least one of the two paths is
connected (𝑥125 = 1 or 𝑥145 = 1), and 𝑥15 = 0, if neither path is connected.
𝑀𝑥15 ≥ 𝑥125 + 𝑥145 ,

(3.10)

𝑥15 ≤ 𝑥125 + 𝑥145 ,

(3.11)

For path x125 , the following linear constraints can be added to accurately describe the connection
status.
𝑥125 ≥ 𝑥12 + 𝑥 25 − 1,

(3.12)

𝑥125 ≤ 𝑥12,

(3.13)

𝑥125 ≤ 𝑥25.

(3.14)

Equation (3.12), (3.13) and (3.14) guarantee that 𝑥125 = 1, if both 𝑥12 and 𝑥 25 are equal to 1, and
𝑥125 = 0, if any of them is 0. Similarly, 𝑥145 and other connection relationship can be converted to linear.
There linear constraints are used in the formulation of the mathematical solutions.
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Table 3-2. Decomposed Node Connection Logical Constraints
Nodes

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

x12 =1&x25 =

x12 =1&x26 =

x13 =1&x37 =

1 or

1 or

1 or

x14 =1&x45 =

x13 =1&x36 =

x14 =1&x47 =

1

1

1

x25 =1

x26 =1

-

8

x1258 =1, or x1268 =1,
1

-

x12 =1

x13 =1

x14 =1

or x1368 =1, or x1378 =1,
or x1458 =1, or x1478 =1

x25 =1&x58 =1 or
2

-

-

-

x26 =1&x68 =1
x36 =1&x68 =1 or
3

-

-

-

x36 =1

x37 =1

Nodes

x37 =1&x78 =1
x45 =1& x58 =1 or
4

-

x45 =1

-

x47 =1
x47 =1&x78 =1

5

-

6
7

8

-

-

x58 =1

-

-

x68 =1

-

x78 =1
-
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3.3.4 Optimization Results
To test our models, we collect data on 1219 California nursing homes over the 5 years since the inception
of CMS’s Nursing home rating system from 2009 to 2013. The data consists of 3 parts: ratings, finances,
and complaints. The ratings dataset is collected directly from CMS and contains nursing homes’ ratings
in the three domains as well as their basic information, such as location, size, certificate and ownership.
The finances dataset data is obtained from California Office of Statewide Health Planning and
Development (OSHPD) and contains the detailed revenues and expenses of each nursing home. The
complaints data is obtained from California Department of Public Health (CDPH) and contains detailed
complaints, incidents and deficiency reports of all California nursing homes. The CDPH complaint data
not only covers complaints that CMS have already considered in its rating procedure, but also includes
complaints and deficiency reports that are only state-wide and are not reported to CMS. The three
datasets are combined and used for setting parameters in our model, for example, the probability of
showing each rating combination as listed in Table 3-3, or nursing homes’ financial profits.
The above two models are solved in the IBM ILOG CPLEX Optimization Studio (IBM, 2015).
Table 3-4(a) shows the values of the objective function when we solve for minimizing the percentage of
nursing homes that can inflate. If no inspection is conducted, every nursing home can inflate, thus the
objective value will be close to 100%. Note that a small portion of nursing homes that genuinely have
gained 5 stars in all three domains, do not need to further inflate their ratings, and thus the total
percentage of nursing homes that can inflate is smaller than 100% even when no inspection is conducted.
If every measure is inspected, no nursing home can inflate, thus the objective value will be 0.
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Table 3-3. Rating Pattern Probabilities (1 for a 5-star rating and 0 for other ratings, based on CMS
pooled data 2009-2013)
Pattern

000

100

010

001

101

110

011

111

Probability

0.6955

0.0540

0.0349

0.1667

0.0267

0.0055

0.0119

0.0048
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Table 3-4. Inspection Measure Selection Results
Inspected Measures

ABC

BC

AB

B

AC

C

A

Objective Value

0

0.808

0.923

0.946

0.966

0.975

0.992

(a) Minimizing the Percentage of Nursing Homes That Can Inflate

Inspected Measures

ABC

A

AC

C

AB

B

BC

Objective Value

0

0.001288

0.009363

0.015885

0.023533

0.042502

0.095107

(b) Minimizing the Difficulty to Detect Inflators
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As we defined earlier, the audit difficulty is the product of inflating population and the probability
of the rating combination at the ending node. For example, if 5% of the nursing homes can inflate their
ratings to a particular node, and the probability to observe the rating combination of that node is 10%,
then the audit difficulty is defined to be 0.050.1 = 0.005.

Since we cannot estimate the cost of

inspecting each domain and the total resources available to CMS, we keep the problem setting as close as
possible to the CMS’s current practice, and focus on the case that only one measure is inspected. As
shown in Table 3-4(b), when the objective function is minimizing the percentage of nursing homes that
can inflate, inspecting the Staffing domain is the optimal choice for CMS. However, when minimizing
the difficulty for detecting the inflators, the current practice of conducing health infections is the optimal
choice.

3.4 Audit Strategy
As discussed in Section 3, the current inspection domain is optimal for CMS in terms of detecting
inflators. Unfortunately, CMS currently does not have an audit policy for the nursing homes’ selfreported measures and the inflators rarely get caught. In this section, we design an audit system for CMS
and conduct a one-year audit simulation based on the most recent available data for year 2013. Table 3-5
lists all the notations and symbols used in the audit simulation.
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Table 3-5. Notations and Symbols used in the Audit Simulation
p1

The audit percentage of nursing homes whose star ratings increase one star after self-reporting

p2

The audit percentage of nursing homes whose star ratings increase one star after self-reporting

r

The punishment rate

B0

The net budget CMS has at the beginning of the year

c

The cost for auditing one nursing home

A1

The additional profit a nursing home can gain by improving its rating by one star

A2

The additional profit a nursing home can gain by improving its rating by two stars

PCI

The percentage of caught inflators

PAH

The percentage of audited honest nursing homes

74

Our audit design assumes that CMS continues inspecting the current domain (Health Inspection)
to minimize the difficulty for detecting inflators. We assume that CMS publicly announces the following
audit policy to all nursing homes:
•

Nursing homes whose overall star ratings increase after self-reporting are subject to audit. An
audit can distinguish honest from inflating nursing home without any errors. That is, if audited, an
inflating nursing home will definitely get caught and an honest nursing will definitely get
exonerated.

•

Nursing homes whose rating increase 1 star or 2 stars after self-reporting will be randomly
selected for auditing. The probabilities to be selected are 𝑝1 and 𝑝2, respectively.

•

Each caught inflator is subject to a fine calculated based on the illegitimate profit it has gained
through inflation. The punishment rate is 𝑟. For example, if a 3-star nursing home inflates its
rating to 5 stars and consequently increases its per patient profit from 10 to 17, then the nursing
home’s illegitimate profit is 17 − 10 = 7. If it is caught in the audit, its punishment will be
7 × (1 + 𝑟). The expected profit for each nursing home is calculated by using the OSHPD
financial data for nursing homes.

•

CMS is a federal agency and its budget is assigned on an annual basis. To reflect this fact in the
audit simulation, we assume that CMS has a fixed net audit budget (𝐵0 ) at each year from
government financial allocation. We further assume that all penalties collected from caught
inflators and the net audit budget B0 are used in auditing nursing homes within the same year.

3.4.1 Nursing Homes’ Reaction to Audit Policy
Given CMS’s audit policy, nursing homes which have the intention to inflate will have to decide what to
self-report. By using the latest available year (2013) in our dataset, and by applying the method presented
in Han et al. (2015) using a 90% CI, we can identify the likely inflators in the population. There was no
effective audit on nursing homes’ self-reported measures in 2013, thus nursing homes who did not inflate
their ratings are identified to be honest, and assumed to have no intention to inflate, no matter what audit
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policy is used. The nursing home population is then divided into two groups: the inflators and honest
nursing homes. The inflators will react to different audit policies differently, while the honest nursing
homes will report the truth, no matter what audit policy is used. By using OSHPD financial data for
nursing home, we can also calculate the expected profit for nursing homes in each Health Inspection star
rating. We denote the additional profit for inflating one star or two stars as 𝐴1 and by 𝐴 2, respectively.
According to the rating mechanism, nursing homes receiving one star or four stars in health inspections
can only increase their overall ratings by one star, thus for them, 𝐴1 and 𝐴 2 are equal.
Any nursing home reporting a star increase will be subject to CMS’s audit. Nursing homes
whose overall ratings increases by one star or two stars are randomly selected for auditing according to
pre-announced probability 𝑝1 and 𝑝2 , respectively. If an inflator is caught, the illegitimate additional
profit gained through inflating will be confiscated and a fine will be issued against the nursing home
based on the pre-announced rate r. As a result, for a given combination of 𝑝1 , 𝑝2 and 𝑟, a nursing home
considering inflating calculates its expected payoff for the following three choices:
•

Being honest: Payoff0= 0

•

Inflating one measure: Payoff1 = 𝐴1 (1 − 𝑝1 ) − 𝑝1 𝑟 𝐴1 = 𝐴1 (1 − 𝑝1 − 𝑝1 𝑟)

•

Inflating both measures:Payoff2 = 𝐴 2 (1 − 𝑝2 ) − 𝑝2 𝑟𝐴 2 = 𝐴 2 (1 − 𝑝2 − 𝑝2 𝑟)

The nursing home will inflate its rating if 1 − 𝑝1 − 𝑝1 𝑟 > 0 or 1 − 𝑝2 − 𝑝2 𝑟 > 0. That is
𝑟<

1−𝑝1

𝑟<

1−𝑝2

𝑝1

𝑝2

, or

(3.15)

(3.16)

.

If either equation (3.15) or equation (3.16) is satisfied, then the nursing home will choose to
inflate. If equation (3.15) and (3.16) are both satisfied, then the nursing home compares the expected
payoffs, and will inflate two stars instead of one star, if
∆𝐴 2 (1 − 𝑝2 − 𝑝2 𝑟) > ∆𝐴1 (1 − 𝑝1 − 𝑝1 𝑟).

(3.17)
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3.4.2 Objective Functions of Audit Strategy
An increase in the overall star rating is not limited to inflating nursing homes only and can also be the
result of legitimate efforts by honest nursing homes to improve their performance. From CMS’s point of
view, auditing an honest nursing home will lead to a waste of audit resource, while auditing an inflating
nursing home will deter others and result in collection of additional penalties which will fund more audits.
Suppose the population of nursing homes whose ratings increase by 1 and by 2 stars are 𝜋1 and
𝜋2, respectively. In addition to inflating nursing homes,  1 and  2 also include honest nursing homes
reporting rating improvements. Both 𝜋1 and 𝜋2 are functions of 𝑝1 , 𝑝2 and 𝑟. The unit cost for auditing a
nursing home is denoted by 𝑐. The fine collected from the caught inflators is also a function of 𝑝1 , 𝑝2 and
𝑟 and is denoted by 𝐹 (𝑝1 , 𝑝2 , 𝑟) . We consider the following two objectives for designing the audit system
for CMS, both of which are important indicators of the performance of an audit system.
•

For targeted auditing probabilities 𝑝1 and 𝑝2, CMS wants to minimize the initial fixed budget
(𝐵0 ).

•

CMS wants to maximize the efficiency of its audits, as the ratio between the percentage of caught
inflators and the percentage of audited honest nursing homes. That is CMS wants more resources
spent on auditing inflators and less resources wasted on auditing honest nursing homes.
For either objective used, CMS needs to make sure the following budget constraint is satisfied.
𝜋1 (𝑝1 , 𝑝2 , 𝑟)𝑝1 𝑐 + 𝜋2 (𝑝1 , 𝑝2 , 𝑟) 𝑝2 𝑐 ≤ 𝐵0 + 𝐹(𝑝1 , 𝑝2 , 𝑟)

(3.18)

The left-hand side of equation (3.18) denotes the total costs for auditing selected nursing homes.
It includes both honest and inflating nursing homes selected to be audited. The inflators will then get
caught and fined, and the collected fines will be added to CMS’s initial budget, 𝐵0 , as shown on the righthand side of equation (3.18). For simplicity, in (3.18), we assume the fines are immediately collected and
can be used toward auditing more nursing homes within the same year.
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3.4.3 Simulation Results
Neither the initial budget, nor the audit efficiency can be easily formulated in a linear form. In view of
this, we conduct a simulation to summarize useful insights on parameter settings instead of solving the
problem analytically.
Consider a one year setting in which CMS’s audit policy is announced at the beginning of the
year. Given CMS’s audit policy, inflating nursing homes react differently according to the expected
payoffs; some choose to inflate two measures, some choose to inflate one measure, and some choose not
to inflate. By the end of the year, CMS conducts the audit by randomly selecting 𝑝1 percent of the
nursing homes whose star ratings increase by one star, and 𝑝2 percent of the nursing homes whose star
ratings increase by two stars. The caught inflators are fined according to the punishment rate 𝑟. CMS
keeps the total cost of audit under the initial budget 𝐵0 plus the collected fines. We set the simulation
parameters by using the 2013 data, which is the latest available in our dataset. According to the method
developed in Han et al. (2015), we pre-identify the likely inflators in the nursing home population. We
then exhaust all possible combinations of 𝑝1 , 𝑝2 and 𝑟 with step size 0.01, and calculate the net budget 𝐵0
and the audit efficiency.
The analysis of the relationship between the initial audit budget, 𝐵0 , the probability of audits, 𝑝1 ,
𝑝2, and the rate of penalties, 𝑟, is important, albeit complicated. Increasing the audit probabilities, and the
penalties on one hand results in more inflators being caught, and more funds being collected and therefore
lowers the level of required initial budget, while on the other hand, it deters some of the nursing homes
from inflating, which in turn reduces the number of inflators being caught and the penalties being
collected which increases the level of required initial budget.
Complete Inflation Determent:
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It is of significant importance for CMS to analyze the optimal parameter settings to completely deter
inflation. According to equation (3.17), nursing homes will stop inflating when the expected payoff of
inflation equals 0. The conditions are expressed in equation (3.19) and (3.20).
∆𝐴1 (1 − 𝑝1 ) − ∆𝐴1 𝑝1 𝑟 = 0,

(3.19)

∆𝐴 2 (1 − 𝑝2 ) − ∆𝐴 2𝑝2 𝑟 = 0.

(3.20)

Solving equation (3.19) and (3.20), we can obtain the marginal probability for deterring inflation:
𝑝1 = 𝑝2 =

1
1+𝑟

.

(3.21)

Equation (3.21) is consistent with equation (3.15) and (3.16), and defines the minimum audit
probabilities, 𝑝1 , 𝑝2 for a given penalty rate, 𝑟, to absolutely deter inflation and ensure that no nursing
home has any incentive to inflate. Equation (3.21) also indicates that when 𝑝1 , 𝑝2 are set higher than

1
1+𝑟

,

CMS’s resource will be “wasted” on auditing honest nursing homes who report true improvements, as no
nursing home will have any reason to inflate under those audit policies. Table 3-6 lists the simulation
results of minimum audit probabilities, 𝑝1 , 𝑝2 for a given penalty rate, 𝑟, and the corresponding initial
budget 𝐵0 . The minimums of 𝑝1 and 𝑝2 obtained from the simulation are equal, which is consistent with
equation (3.21). When punishment rate 𝑟 increases, the corresponding minimum 𝑝1 and 𝑝2 needed to
absolutely deter inflating decreases.

This result shows a tradeoff between audit probabilities and

punishment rate to achieve the same level of audit power. From Table 3-6, we also observe that when the
penalty rate 𝑟 increases, the corresponding net budget B 0 decreases. The reason is that when inflation is
absolutely deterred, CMS collects no fine from auditing, and has to solely rely on net budget B0 to support
the audit. Under this circumstance, the lower p1 and p2 are, the smaller audit work load is required, thus
the less net budget is needed. The results also indicate that though increasing audit probabilities and
increasing penalty rate can both deter inflation, the way they function is different. When increasing audit
probabilities, CMS increases the audit work load at the same time, and the audit cost, which is
proportional to the audit work load in our model, will increase. On the other hand, increasing the
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punishment rate has no explicit relationship with the increase of audit work load, and can be a more
economical way for CMS to deter inflation.
Incomplete Inflation Determent:
Completely deterring rating inflation, though desirable , may not be feasible in reality, since the audit
probability is limited by financial budget and human resource, and the maximum punishment rate is
typically restricted by law. While certain level of inflation may be inevitable, the problem for CMS
changes to find the optimal parameter settings under the given net budget.

Since audits impose

unnecessarily burdens on honest nursing homes, it is desirable that CMS can focus its resources to audit
more inflators and fewer honest nursing homes. Following this idea, we formulate the audit efficiency.
We define the Percentage of Caught Inflators (PCI) to be the ratio between caught inflators and the total
inflators in the system, and the Percentage of Audited Honest Nursing Homes (PAH) to be the ratio
between audited honest nursing homes and the total honest nursing homes in the system. By definition,
both PCI and PAH are within the interval [0, 1]. The audit efficiency curve, defined as the corresponding
PCI given a certain PAH, denoted as PCI(PAH), can then be plotted in a 11 square area, where the yaxis represents the PCI, and x-axis represents the PAH. Note that a given PAH can be achieved by
multiple combinations of 𝑝1 , 𝑝2, and 𝑟, resulting in different PCIs.
To study the properties of the audit efficiency, we focus on the upper and lower limits of PCI, as
the maximum the minimum of audit efficiency. In the year 2013, the overall star ratings of 496 nursing
homes increased as a result of their self-reported measures, of which 122 are identified as likely inflators
(Han et al., 2015). We set up our simulation based on these statistics. The following propositions are
derived.
Proposition 1:
The maximum audit efficiency is achieved at r=0, and does not change with respect to B 0 , i.e.,

B0x,B0y {0, R+}, B0x  B0y, 𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝐶𝐼(𝑃𝐴𝐻, 𝐵0𝑥 ) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝐶𝐼(𝑃𝐴𝐻, 𝐵0𝑦 ) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝐶𝐼(𝑃𝐴𝐻).
𝑝1,𝑝2,𝑟

𝑝1,𝑝2,𝑟
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𝑝1,𝑝2,0

Proposition 2:
(2.1) Given p 2 and r, the maximum audit efficiency converges to p 2 monotonically when p 1 1.
(2.2) Given p 1 and r, the maximum audit efficiency converges to p 1 when p 21.
𝑝1

(2.3) If ∆𝐴 2 ∙ 𝑝2 − ∆𝐴1 ∙ 𝑝1 < 0, or
change with respect to 𝑟. If

𝑝1
𝑝2

<

𝑝2

>

∆𝐴2
∆𝐴1

> 1, then the maximum audit efficiency does not

∆𝐴2

, then the maximum audit efficiency depends on the values of

∆𝐴1

p 1 , p 2 , ∆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓1 and ∆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓2, and is piecewise linear.
The proofs of the propositions are provided in the appendix.
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Figure 3-3. Efficiency Curves given different net budget B0
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1

Table 3-6. Optimal Policy Parameters for Deterring Inflation

r

0.1

0.3

0.5

0.7

0.9

1.1

1.3

1.5

1.7

1.9

p1

0.91

0.77

0.67

0.59

0.53

0.48

0.44

0.4

0.38

0.35

p2

0.91

0.77

0.67

0.59

0.53

0.48

0.44

0.4

0.38

0.35

B0

340.34

287.98

250.58

220.66

198.22

179.52

164.56

149.6

142.12

130.9
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We justify the propositions using simulation results. Figure 3-3(a) shows the maximum audit
efficiency CMS can achieve given different net budget B 0 . On the contrast, Figure 3-3(b) shows the
lowest audit efficiency CMS can achieve.
According to Figure 3-3, the maximum audit efficiency is achieved at 𝑟=0, and increasing B0
cannot lead to an increase in the audit efficiency. When 𝑟=0, nursing homes have no consequence when
caught inflating, thus all the non-honest nursing homes that may inflate will choose to inflate. As a result,
the inflator proportion in the suspect group reaches the maximum, and the audit efficiency reaches the
maximum at the given audit probabilities. The result is consistent with what is proved in Proposition 1.
In this case, increasing B0 will not result in detecting more inflators, but can only put more honest nursing
homes under audit. On the other hand, the lowest audit efficiency will become even lower when B 0
increases. This is because for the same percentage of caught inflators (PCI), more honest nursing homes
are audited (higher PAH). From Figure 3-3, we also know that the maximum audit efficiency curve is
piecewise linear and monotonically non-decreasing. These properties on the maximum audit efficiency
curve is also consistent with the results derived in Proposition 2.
Combining the conclusion obtained from Table 3-6 in Section 3.4.3, we reach the following
conclusion on audit parameter settings: If CMS has enough net budget to completely deter inflation, then
adopting an audit policy with higher penalty rate is more economical than increasing the audit
probabilities, and will lead to a lower net budget. However, under high punishment rate, few nursing
homes will choose to inflate. As a result, most of the resources will be spent on auditing honest nursing
homes, leading to a low audit efficiency. Increasing audit probabilities can also deter inflation, but it will
increase the total cost of audit as well. If CMS does not have enough net budget to completely deter
inflation, and certain level of inflation is inevitable, the problem is to find an optimal combination of 𝑝1 ,
𝑝2 and 𝑟 for the given net budget. Under this circumstance, we recommend CMS to carefully balance the
tradeoff between net budget and audit efficiency; Specifically, the punishment rate should be relatively
high in order to keep the net audit budget within control; however, the punishment rate cannot be too high
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in order to achieve a good audit efficiency, i.e., a good amount of money should be spent on auditing
inflators, not on auditing honest nursing homes who made real service improvements.

3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we systematically investigate the inspection measure selection and audit design in the
CMS’s nursing home rating system. For the inspection measure selection problem, we formulate it
mathematically by using an innovative graph-based framework, and solve it optimally by using CMS’s
data. Our result indicates that CMS’s current inspection domain is optimal if an effective follow-up audit
policy is in place. We then design the audit system for CMS, with nursing homes’ different reactions
taken into consideration. To study the parameter settings of the audit, we first derive analytical conditions
on the parameter settings, and then conduct a simulation to justify the results. We find that CMS has to
carefully balance the tradeoff between net audit budget and audit efficiency in order to achieve a good
control of self-reporting inflation.
Due to the assumptions and the dataset, this research may have the following limitations. In the
inspection problem, it is difficult to accurately measure the cost for inspecting each measure. Our result
is obtained based on the assumption that the cost for inspecting each measure is similar and comparable.
The real situation may depend on several factors, leading to different cost for inspecting each measure,
e.g., regulations for each area may be different, and the cost for investigat ing each nursing home is case
dependent. Our result, however, is a reasonable estimate of the current system, and provides a theoretical
framework for optimizing the inspection structure. In the audit design, we assume that the fines can be
collected immediately and used in audit within the same year. Since fine collection takes time, and CMS
may have different arrangement of the fines, it is possible that not all fines are available to use within the
same year. Suppose that only a portion, say , of the collected fines can be used in the same year for
auditing. In this case, the audit can be considered to have an adjusted punishment rate r’=r. The
quantitative results we obtained, for example B 0 , will be different in this case, but most qualitative results
should still hold. In view that no audit is currently conducted for nursing homes’ self-reporting, our
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design provides a reasonable plan for CMS, which can serve as a benchmark for other audit system
designs. The audit simulation is conducted based on the 2013 data of the California nursing home market.
For other states or other years, there can be difference in the proportion of inflators. However, we argue
that the population of nursing homes in California is big and the case is representative, and the number of
inflators in year 2013 is reasonably close to the amount in the current system.
Our result not only provides insights and theoretical support for CMS’s current rating system but
also provides guidelines for the future audit mechanism design. Moreover, our result has important
managerial application on other rating systems sharing similar features. A good example is to apply the
results on the Merit-Based Incentive Payment System (MIPS), which rates the physicians based on a
combination of inspection and their self-reported measures, and adjusts the payment rates based on the
ratings. With the fast development of healthcare IT, justifiable self-reported measures can have a wide
application in different rating systems in order to reduce the cost to evaluate these measures. Our
research provides a good framework to systematically control the quality of self-reported measures, which
guarantees the accuracy of online ratings.
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Appendix 3
Proof for Proposition 1:
We first divide the nursing home population into 4 different types, as shown in Figure 3-A.1.
The PAH is calculated as
𝑃𝐴𝐻 =

πHI2 p2 + πHI1 p1
πHI2 + πHI1

Note that PAH is a linear combination of p1 and p2 , since  HI1 and  HI2 are constant.
The PCI is calculated as
𝑃𝐶𝐼 =

πLI2 (𝑝1 , 𝑝2 , 𝑟) ∙ p2 + πLI1 (𝑝1 , 𝑝2 , 𝑟) ∙ p1
1
(π (𝑝 , 𝑝 , 𝑟) ∙ p2 + πLI1 (𝑝1 , 𝑝2 , 𝑟) ∙ p1 )
=
(
)
(
)
πLI2 𝑝1 , 𝑝2 , 𝑟 + πLI1 𝑝1 , 𝑝2 , 𝑟
𝜋𝐿𝐼 LI2 1 2

Where 𝜋𝐿𝐼 = πLI2 (𝑝1 , 𝑝2 , 𝑟) + πLI1 (𝑝1 , 𝑝2 , 𝑟) denotes the total number of inflators in the system. The
first term in the parenthesis denotes the caught inflators from the 2-star suspect group, and the second
term denotes the caught inflators from the 1-star group.
Since πLI2 (𝑝1 , 𝑝2 , 𝑟) and πLI1 (𝑝1 , 𝑝2 , 𝑟) are both non-increasing in r, the linear combination
πLI2 (𝑝1 , 𝑝2 ,𝑟) ∙ p2 + πLI1 (𝑝1 , 𝑝2 , 𝑟) ∙ p1 is maximized at r=0. For higher B0 , higher punishment rate r
can be used in the audit, however, the audit efficiency is maximized at r=0, and higher net budget B 0 does
not result in higher the audit efficiency, i.e., B0x,B0y {0, R+}, B0x  B0y, max 𝑇𝑃𝑅 (𝐹𝑃𝑅, 𝐵0𝑥 ) =
𝑝1,𝑝2,𝑟

max 𝑇𝑃𝑅(𝐹𝑃𝑅, 𝐵0𝑦 ) = max 𝑇𝑃𝑅(𝐹𝑃𝑅)

𝑝1,𝑝2,𝑟

𝑝1,𝑝2,0

Proof for Proposition 2:
(2.1)

The nursing homes having intension to inflate make their decisions based on the expected payoffs

of the following three cases:
0. Not Inflate.

 0 =0

1. Inflate 1 star.

 1 =A1 (1-p1 -p1 r)
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 2 =A2 (1-p2 -p2 r)

2. Inflate 2 stars.

In our problem, we have ∆𝐴1 ≤ ∆𝐴 2 for all rating levels.
Given r and p2 , and set p1 =0, Π2 = ∆𝐴 2 (1 − 𝑝2 − 𝑝2 𝑟), denote the profit when p1 =0 as Π10 = ∆𝐴1
a) If  10   2 , PCI0 =p2 . When p1 increases,  1 decreases, thus  1   2 holds, and PCI=p2
b) If  10 >  2 , PCI0 =p1. When p1 increases,  1 decreases.
The breakpoints is Π2 = 𝐴 2 (1 − 𝑝2 − 𝑝2 𝑟) = ∆𝐴1 (1 − 𝑝1 − 𝑝1 𝑟) = Π1 , i.e.,
𝑝1 ∗=

∆𝐴1 − ∆𝐴 2 + ∆𝐴 2(1 + 𝑟) 𝑝2
∆𝐴1 (1 + 𝑟)

When 𝑝1 > 𝑝1 ∗, we have  1 <  2 , and PCI= p2 . In other words,
PCI=

p1 ,

when 𝑝1 ≤ 𝑝1 ∗

p2 ,

when 𝑝1 > 𝑝1 ∗

Thus if 𝑝1 ∗< 𝑝2 holds, then PCI is monotonically non-decreasing in p1
𝑝1 ∗ −𝑝2 =

Since

∆𝐴1 − ∆𝐴 2 + ∆𝐴 2 (1 + 𝑟)𝑝2 − ∆𝐴1 (1 + 𝑟)𝑝2 ∆𝐴1 − ∆𝐴 2
=
[1 − (1 + 𝑟) 𝑝2 ]
∆𝐴1 (1 + 𝑟)
∆𝐴1 (1 + 𝑟)

∆𝐴1−∆𝐴2
≤
∆𝐴1( 1+𝑟)

0, and 1 − (1 + 𝑟)𝑝2 > 0 when  2 >0, thus 𝑝1 ∗ −𝑝2 ≤ 0, i.e., 𝑝1 ∗< 𝑝2 always

holds when  2 >0. In other words, PCI is monotonically non-decreasing in p1 .
(2.2)

Given r and p1 , and set p2 =0, Π1 = ∆𝐴1 (1 − 𝑝1 − 𝑝1 𝑟), Π20 = ∆𝐴 2 > Π1 , and PCI0 =p2. When p2

increases,  2 decreases.
The breakpoints is Π2 = ∆𝐴 2 (1 − 𝑝2 − 𝑝2 𝑟) = ∆𝐴1 (1 − 𝑝1 − 𝑝1 𝑟) = Π1 , i.e.,
𝑝2 ∗=

∆𝐴 2 − ∆𝐴1 + ∆𝐴1 (1 + 𝑟) 𝑝1
∆𝐴 2 (1 + 𝑟)

When 𝑝2 > 𝑝2 ∗, we have  1 >  2 , and PCI= p1 . In other words,
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PCI=

p2 ,

when 𝑝2 ≤ 𝑝2 ∗

p1 ,

when 𝑝2 > 𝑝2 ∗

Thus if 𝑝2 ∗< 𝑝1 , then PCI is monotonically non-decreasing in p2
𝑝2 ∗ −𝑝1 =

Since

∆𝐴 2 − ∆𝐴1 + ∆𝐴1 (1 + 𝑟)𝑝1 − ∆𝐴 2(1 + 𝑟)𝑝1 ∆𝐴 2 − ∆𝐴1
=
[1 − (1 + 𝑟) 𝑝1 ]
∆𝐴 2 (1 + 𝑟)
∆𝐴 2 (1 + 𝑟)

∆𝐴2−∆𝐴1
∆𝐴2( 1+𝑟)

≥ 0, and 1 − (1 + 𝑟)𝑝1 > 0 when  1 >0, thus 𝑝2 ∗ −𝑝1 ≥ 0, i.e., 𝑝2 ∗> 𝑝1 , as a

result, when p2 increases, PCI increases to p2 *>p1 first, then drops back to p1 and stay at p1. PCI is NOT
monotonic in p2 .
(2.3)

Given p1 and p2 , set r0 =0, thus Π20 = ∆𝐴 2 (1 − 𝑝2 ), Π10 = ∆𝐴1 (1 − 𝑝1 ),
If Π20 > Π10 , we have
∆𝐴 2 (1 − 𝑝2 ) > ∆𝐴1 (1 − 𝑝1 )
∆𝐴 2 − ∆𝐴1 > ∆𝐴 2 𝑝2 − ∆𝐴1 𝑝1
Since ∆𝐴 2 − ∆𝐴1 ≥ 0, if ∆𝐴 2 𝑝2 − ∆𝐴1 𝑝1 < 0, then Π20 > Π10 holds.
When r increases, if Π2 > Π1 still holds, then PCI does not change. In other words,
∆𝐴 2(1 − 𝑝2 − 𝑝2 𝑟) > ∆𝐴1 (1 − 𝑝1 − 𝑝1 𝑟)
Or
∆𝐴 2 − ∆𝐴1 > (∆𝐴 2 𝑝2 − ∆𝐴1 𝑝1 )(1 + 𝑟)

Case 1: If ∆𝐴 2 𝑝2 − ∆𝐴1 𝑝1 < 0, when r increases, the RHS decreases, thus the above equation always
holds. In this case, Π2 > Π1 holds when r increases. PCI=p2, and will not change.
Case 2: If ∆𝐴 2 𝑝2 − ∆𝐴1 𝑝1 > 0, three subcases can be discussed.
a: If p1 >p2 , then Π20 > Π10 , the payoff functions are shown in Figure 3-A.1 (a).
In this case  2 > 1 holds for >0, thus PCI=p2 , and will not change.
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b: If p1 <p2 , then if Π20 > Π10 , PCI=p2 , the payoff functions are shown in Figure 3-A.1 (b).
In this case, when 𝑟 <
When 𝑟 >

∆𝐴2−∆𝐴1
∆𝐴2𝑝2−∆𝐴1𝑝1

∆𝐴2−∆𝐴1
∆𝐴2𝑝2−∆𝐴1𝑝1

− 1, then  1 <  2 , and PCI = p2 .

− 1, then  1 >  2 , and PCI = p1 .

c: If p1 <p2 , then when Π20 < Π10 , the payoff functions are shown in Figure 3-A.1(c).
In this case,  1 >  2 always holds , and PCI = p1 , and will not change.
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Figure 3-A.1. Three Cases of the Profit Function

(a)

(b)

(c)
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Table 3-A.1. Nursing Home (NH) Population Partition

True Service Quality
H

L

 HI : NHs improve star rating legitimate ly,
including  HI1 and  HI2

Star Increase

I

 HI2 – Honest NHs reporting 2-star improvement
 HI1 – Honest NHs reporting 1-star improvement

 LI : Inflators, including  LI1 and  LI2
 LI2 – Inflators inflating 1 star a
 LI1 – Inflators inflating 2 stars b

( LI0 ): Potential inflators who choose not
NI

to inflate c

 HNI : Established NHs

 LNI : “Abandoned” NHs

a. Nursing homes choosing to inflate 2 stars, if any, are confounded with the population  HI2
b. Nursing homes choosing to inflate 1 star, if any, are confounded with the population HI1
c. Nursing homes with the intention to inflate but decide not to inflate due to unfavorable expected payoff.
They are confounded with other honest nursing homes, and are also not the focus of audit.
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Chapter 4. Once for Ado: The Impact of Internet of Things Adoption and
Subsidization
4.1. Introduction

Nursing homes are an important piece in the U.S. healthcare system. Today there are over 16000 nursing
home facilities in the U.S., providing care to 1.5 million residents. They account for 6 percent of the
Medicare population but 17 percent of total Medicare spending. The service quality of nursing homes,
however, varies significantly. In 2007, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) designed
and implemented its 5-star nursing home rating system. Since its inception, the CMS rating has become
the gold standard in the industry, and has been widely popular among patients, physicians and payers
(Thomas, 2014). The CMS 5-star rating system rates nursing homes based on three measures: on-site
Inspection, Staffing and Quality Measures. The on-site inspections are conducted by CMS-certified
inspectors, while the other two domains are self-reported by nursing homes. The overall star ratings is
calculated by using the inspection star rating as a baseline, adding 1 star if any self-reported domain is 5
stars and subtracting 1 star if any self-reported domain is 1 star (CMS, 2015). Obviously, the two selfreported domains can change a nursing home’s rating fundamentally. An average nursing home which
receives 3 stars in CMS inspection can have an excellent 5-star overall rating, if its two self-reported
measures are 5 stars. Cases have been reported in which patients’ experiences differ significantly from
the CMS star ratings. Some highly-rated nursing homes are sued for substandard care, even causing death
of patient due to improper medical treatments. Our previous research has found a significant positive
association between nursing homes’ star rating change and their financial incentives to achieve high
rating (Han 2015), and this association cannot be simply explained by nursing homes’ legitimate efforts.
In other words, rating inflation does exist in the current system.
In recent years, the emergence of the Internet of Things (IoT) concept has gradually drawn the
public attention, and presents new opportunities for research. Internet of Things (IoT) typically refer to a
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system of interrelated sensors, objects, mobile devices, mechanical and digital machines that are provided
with unique identifiers and are able to transfer data over a network without requiring human-to-human or
human-to-computer interaction. Technologies based on IoT concepts have been successfully developed in
the healthcare field, especially in the senior community and nursing homes. For example, tracking
devices with IoT technologies have been introduced to track the movement of senior patients and detect
sudden falls.

Although these IoT applications in nursing homes are still relatively new and non-

systematical, the idea of applying IoT and related technologies is getting more and more popular, and can
be a promising way to improve nursing homes’ service quality.
The adoption of IoT technologies in nursing homes could significantly change the way nursing
homes self-reports on both domains. Starting July 2016, CMS’s requires all nursing homes to report
Payroll- based journal (PBJ), and will relate these results with the self-reported staffing level (CMS,
2016a). Meanwhile, in the QM domain, CMS is going to add 5 additional measures (out of the 6 newly
posted measures) to the current 9 measures (out of 18 measures) when giving the QM rating (CMS,
2016b).

These requirements impose huge burdens on nursing homes’ daily operations, leading to

additional operational costs. The above staffing and quality measure data, however, can be collected
automatically by using devices based on IoT technologies (Stenner 2011, Krawiec 2015). As a result, IoT
adoption could possibly release nursing homes from the burdens of self-reporting.
Another potential use of IoT devices is to control self-reporting inflation. When IoT devices are
used, the data about the corresponding field which is previously self-reported is now automatically
collected by these devices. As a result, these potential inflators will have less room to inflate during selfreporting, leading to more robust data collection.
From CMS’s perspective, IoT adoption is not only a promising way to improve nursing homes’
service quality, but also serves an alternative way to control rating inflation comparing with the traditional
audit method. However, IoT techniques can be costly, which can be a major barrier for IoT adoption. On
the other hand, auditing an honest nursing home not only imposes huge burden to the nursing home, but
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also wasted limited financial budget and human resources. The fact triggers the interesting question that
whether CMS can allocate certain amount of audit budget to subsidize nursing homes for IoT adoption.
The subsidization gives nursing homes incentives to adopt IoT techniques, and reduces the ability that
potential inflators can inflate, thus IoT subsidization can be a win-win situation for both nursing homes
and CMS.
In this chapter, we systematically investigate the impact of IoT adoption on both the CMS rating
system and on nursing homes’ decisions. The chapter proceeds as follows: In Section 4.2, we analyze
the optimal staffing and IoT adoption level decisions for both honest nursing homes and inflators. The
results indicate that inflators are more reluctant to adopt IoT than the honest ones, since IoT adoption
limits the ability of inflating. We also find diversified staffing level reaction to IoT adoption for nursing
homes with different service qualities. We then analyze how the optimal IoT adoption level can be
affected by CMS’s auditing and subsidization. In Section 4.3, we analyze the problem from CMS’s
perspective, and obtain insights for CMS on allocating budget between auditing and subsidization. The
chapter is concluded in Section 4.4.

4.2 Nursing Homes’ Problem Formulation
In this section, we first derive the framework for nursing homes’ profit maximization problem. The
general problem formulation for a nursing home’s problem is presented. We then analyze honest nursing
homes and inflators separately, and derive optimal IoT adoption and staffing decisions for both types.
4.2.1 General Formulation
We first build a general analytical model for nursing homes’ profit maximization problem 3 . A list of
symbols used in this formulation can be found in Table 4-1. As discussed in the literature, the staff-to-

3

Though not all the nursing homes are for-profit nursing homes, for-profit nursing homes are the majority.
According to CMS data, at least 60% of nursing homes are for -profit nursing homes. The remaining nursing homes
are non-profit nursing homes or government owned nursing homes, which also pursue surplus income as the forprofit ones, but they distribute the surplus income as dividends rather than profits. In this research, we do not
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patient ratio has been proved to be a major factor affecting the service quality of a nursing home (Lu 2015,
Konetzaka 2008). In our model, we use s to denote the staff-to-patient ratio4 , i.e., the per patient staffing
level. Depending on the type of the nursing home, we assume s(0, 𝑠̅), where 𝑠̅ is the maximum staffing
level nursing homes can have. Besides staffing coverage, IoT adoption level is another key factor
affecting the service quality of nursing homes. In our model, we use k to denote the IoT adoption rate,
k[0, 1], i.e., a nursing home can choose not to use any IoT technology, choose to fully rely on IoT
devices to collect data and do self-reporting, or choose to adopt IoT technologies at any level k in order to
maximize its profit. The two decisions, staffing level and IoT adoption level, may also affect each other.
The service quality of a nursing home is then denoted as 𝑄(𝑠, 𝑘).

differentiate the differ ence between for-profit nursing homes and non-profit or government owned nursing homes,
and assume all nursing homes maximize its profits as its goal.
4 To keep the formulation consistent, we use the per patient staffing level, profit/revenue as the calculating unit
throughout this dissertation.
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Table 4-1 Symbols in the Problem Formulation
R

Nursing home’s revenue

Cs

Staffing cost

Ck

IoT adoption cost

Uk

IoT subsidization

A

Highest revenue a nursing home with staffing level s and IoT level k can achieve



Nursing home revenue vertical position factor (different for each nursing home)

s

Nursing home’s staffing level

k

Nursing home’s IoT adoption level

r

Punishment rate

p

Audit probability

u

Subsidization rate

w

Staffing wage

v

IoT unit adoption cost

A

Maximum inflation gain

CAud

Unit audit cost

N

Total Population

NII

Inflator population

NHI/NHN Population of honest NHs whose rating increase/do not increase
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Besides service quality, nursing homes’ vertical position in its competing market can also affect
its revenue function. The vertical position of a nursing home can be viewed as the reputation of a nursing
home, which is closely related to its CMS star rating. It has been shown in Han et al (2015) that highly
rated nursing homes have significantly higher revenues than their poorly rated counterparts. In our
formulation, we use  to denote a nursing home’s vertical position in the market,  > 0. For each nursing
home,  is different. We use A to denote the highest revenue a nursing home can achieve. A nursing
home’s revenue R can then be expressed as a function of its service quality Q and its vertical position  as
R(Q,  ). Since Q is a function of s and k, we can equivalently express the revenue as R(s, k,  ), a
function of staffing level s, IoT adoption level k, and vertical position  . Since  is exogenous, we
simplify the notation and use R(s, k) to denote the revenue function of a nursing home. In our model, we
require R to be increasing in s and k, i.e.,
𝑅 (𝑠, 𝑘 + ∆𝑘) > 𝑅(𝑠, 𝑘) ,

(4.1)

𝑅 (𝑠 + ∆𝑠, 𝑘) > 𝑅(𝑠, 𝑘).

(4.2)

Further, we require R to be capped by the most profitable type of patients, i.e., R is concave in
both k and s, i.e.,

𝜕2𝑅
𝜕𝑘 2

< 0, and

𝜕2𝑅
𝜕𝑠2

< 0, and 𝑙𝑖𝑚

𝜕𝑅
𝜕𝑠

= 0, 𝑙𝑖𝑚

𝜕𝑅
𝜕𝑘

= 0. The assumption is based on the

fact that no matter how high a nursing home’s staffing level is, or how advanced a nursing home’s IoT
adoption level is, the revenue cannot go to infinity. There is always a margin patient whose net utility of
going to the nursing home is 0, i.e., it is indifferent for the patient to go to the nursing home or not.
The operational costs of nursing homes are divided into two parts. The cost associated with
staffing level is denoted as Cs , which meaning refers to wages paid to nurses and administration staff. In
our model, re require Cs to be increasing and convex in s, i.e.,

𝜕𝐶𝑠
𝜕𝑠

> 0,

𝜕2 𝐶𝑠
𝜕 𝑠2

> 0. Another part of cost is

associated with IoT adoption, and is denoted as Ck. This part mainly includes the maintenance of IoT
devices. Similar to Cs , in our model, we require Ck to be increasing and convex in k.
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In this research, we propose CMS to consider subsidizing nursing homes who adopt IoT
technologies. We use function Uk of k to denote the amount CMS sets to subsidize IoT adoption. Similar
to the cost functions Cs and Ck, we require Uk to be also increasing and convex in k, i.e.,

𝜕𝑈𝑘
𝜕𝑘

> 0,

𝜕2 𝑈𝑘
𝜕𝑘 2

≥

0.
A nursing home maximizes its profit by optimizing its staffing level s and IoT adoption k. A
general form of a nursing home’s profit function is then given in equation (4.3).
𝜋 = 𝑅 (𝑠, 𝑘) − 𝐶𝑠 − 𝐶𝑘 + 𝑈𝑘,

(4.3)

where Cs is the staffing cost, Ck is the IoT adoption cost, and U k is the IoT adoption subsidization which is
associated with the IoT adoption level. If a nursing home does not adopt IoT technologies in its operation,
then k = 0, and the nursing home has complete freedom on self-reporting decisions, though they can be
audited after self-reporting. In this case, the nursing home incurs zero cost on IoT technologies, and do
not receive any subsidization for CMS, i.e., Ck = 0, and Uk = 0. If a nursing home fully adopt IoT
technologies, and completely rely on IoT technologies to collecting data for the self-reporting measures,
then k=1. In this case, the nursing home’s IoT cost Ck reaches the maximum, but the subsidization Uk
also reaches the maximum.
It is ideally to obtain close form solutions on nursing homes’ optimal decision. In the following
analysis, we assume the following function forms for revenue function R, staffing cost Cs , IoT adoption
cost Ck, and subsidization function Uk. Our functions are in line with the existing literature on nursing
homes’ staffing problems (Lu et al., 2015).
𝑅 (𝑠, 𝑘) = 𝐴 − 𝛼𝑒 −𝛼𝑠𝑘,

(4.4)

𝐶𝑠 = 𝑤𝑠,

(4.5)

𝐶𝑘 = 𝑣𝑘,

(4.6)

𝑈𝑘 = 𝑢𝑘

(4.7)
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in which A denotes the maximum revenue a nursing home can achieve for its rating level, and 𝛼 is the
revenue discount coefficient. It can be easily verified that R(s, k) satisfies all the assumptions we made
over revenue function, i.e.,

𝜕𝑅
𝜕𝑠

> 0,

𝜕𝑅
𝜕𝑘

> 0,

𝜕𝑅
𝜕𝑄

> 0,

𝜕2 𝑅
𝜕𝑄

< 0 and 𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑄→∞

𝜕𝑅
𝜕𝑄

= 0.

Following most

literature, we use a linear form of staffing cost function, which is also close to the reality. We assume a
linear form of the IoT cost function, in which Ck is proportional to the IoT adoption level k. We also
assume a linear form of the subsidization function 𝑈𝑘 , which is proportional to the nursing home’s IoT
adoption level k. In view that the QM domain consists of a bunch of detailed measures on each of the
major aspects on patients’ daily life and can be itemized, the linear assumption on IoT cost function and
subsidization function is also reasonable.
In the following, we analyze nursing homes’ profits in extreme cases of s and k combination. If
IoT adoption is k = 1, and s is big, i.e., the nursing home’s IoT technology level is advanced and staffing
level is very high, then the revenue R approaches A, which is the maximum revenue the nursing home can
achieve. If s is very small (close to 0), i.e., the facility is understaffed, then the revenue R approaches A𝛼, the lower limit of revenue. The case of k = 0 can be analyzed similarly, and it represents the case that
the IoT technology level in the nursing home is very low.
The general form of a nursing home’s profit maximization problem can then be written as
max 𝜋 = 𝑅(𝑠, 𝑘) − 𝐶𝑠 − 𝐶𝑘 + 𝑈𝑘 = 𝐴 − 𝛼𝑒 −𝛼𝑠𝑘 − 𝑤𝑠 − 𝑣𝑘 + 𝑢𝑘..
𝑠,𝑘

(4.8)

Since honest nursing homes and inflators have different objectives when adopting IoT, we discuss
these two types of nursing homes separately in the following.
4.2.2 Nursing Homes’ Optimal Decisions
Honest Nursing Homes: Honest nursing homes looking for service improvement may embrace IoT since
these devices and techniques can improve the quality of care they can provide. For an honest nursing
home, its profit maximization problem can be written as
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max 𝜋𝐻 = 𝑅(𝑠, 𝑘) − 𝐶𝑠 − 𝐶𝑘 + 𝑈𝑘 = 𝐴 − 𝛼𝑒 −𝛼𝑠𝑘 − 𝑤𝑠 − 𝑣𝑘 + 𝑢𝑘.

(4.9)

By taking partial derivatives of the profit function with respect to the decision variables s and k,
we can solve equation (4.9), and obtain the following result.
𝜕𝜋
𝜕𝑘

= 𝑠𝛼 2 𝑒 −𝛼𝑠𝑘 − 𝑣 + 𝑢 = 0

𝑘 ∗=
𝜕𝜋
𝜕𝑠

1
𝛼𝑠

𝑙𝑛

(4.10)

𝑠𝛼2

(4.11)

𝑣−𝑢

= 𝑘𝛼 2 𝑒 −𝛼𝑠𝑘 − 𝑤 = 0

𝑠 ∗=

1
𝛼𝑘

𝑙𝑛

(4.12)

𝑘𝛼2

(4.13)

𝑤

Inflating Nursing Homes: For inflators, they can also enjoy the benefits that IoT can bring to honest
nursing homes, but they have additional concerns, since IoT adoption will squeeze the room that they can
misreport, and make their inflation more difficult. As a result, the inflating nursing homes have to take
different audit policies into consideration, and may have different attitude to IoT adoption comparing with
their honest counterparts.
Though CMS currently does not have an audit in place, it has been demonstrated in the previous
chapter that audit is necessary in order to control inflation. In this chapter, we keep the audit design
consistent with our previous work. In the audit, we assume CMS pre-announces its audit policy, with a
proportion p and punishment rate r. If nursing homes report increased star rating in self-reporting, they
will be randomly selected based on the announced proportion p. If an inflator is selected for audit, it will
be caught. Its illegitimate profit gain will be confiscated, and a fine will be issued against it, which is
calculated based on the punishment rate r. The inflators will then calculate their expected payoffs based
on the policy announced and decide whether to inflate or not. Define the maximum profit gain through
inflation to be ∆𝐴.

In our model, ∆𝐴 is achieved only when the inflator does not adopt any IoT

technology, i.e., k = 0. According to our assumption, when a nursing home fully adopt IoT technologies,
the nursing homes’ data collection will completely depend on IoT devices, and there will be no room for
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the nursing home to inflate, i.e., ∆𝐴 = 0, when k = 1. We thus use a linear function to denote a inflating
nursing home’s illegitimate maximum revenue A’.
𝐴 ′ = 𝐴 + (1 − 𝑘)∆𝐴

(4.14)

Apparently, A’>A and the illegitimate profit takes values in [0, ∆𝐴].
An important question to ask is that under what condition will the inflators choose to inflate. To
provide answer to this question, we compare the expected revenue of an inflator when it is inflating, and
the revenue of the same nursing home when it chooses to stay honest, as shown in equation (4.15). An
inflator will inflate only when the expected revenue of inflating is higher than that of being honest.
𝑝[𝐴 − 𝛼𝑒 −𝛼𝑠𝑘 − 𝑟∆𝐴 (1 − 𝑘)] + +(1 − 𝑝)(𝐴 + ∆𝐴 (1 − 𝑘) − 𝛼𝑒 −𝛼𝑠𝑘 ) > 𝐴 − 𝛼𝑒 −𝛼𝑠𝑘,

(4.15)

Solving equation (4.15), we can obtain the inflating condition:
1-p-pr>0, or
𝑝<

1

(4.16)

.

(4.17)

1+𝑟

In other words, the inflators make inflation decisions according to the announced audit policy (p,r)
only. If p and r satisfy the condition listed in (4.17), the expected revenue of inflating will exceed the
revenue of being honest, and inflator will choose to inflate 5 . The IoT adoption can reduce the extent to
which the inflator can inflate, but cannot change the inflators’ decisions. In order to avoid trivial cases
that all nursing homes are deterred from inflating, our model, we assume that inflating condition (4.17) is
always satisfied, i.e., there are always inflators in the system, and they will always choose to inflate. The
population of the inflators is assumed to be constant.
For inflators, its profit maximization can be expressed as:
5

Different from the settings in chapter 3, we use a simplified model in this research in which we do not consider
the possibility that some inflating nursing homes may only inflate 1 star, though inflating 2 stars is possible. Such
case exists in reality due to the fact that the probability to be audited when inflating 2 stars can be set higher than
that of inflating 1 star. There can be other legal costs, which deter nursing homes from inflating to the maximum
level though possible. However, in our model, we do not capture these aspects, and assume that the punishment
to inflators are purely financial.
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max 𝜋𝐼 = 𝑝[𝐴 − 𝛼𝑒 −𝛼𝑠𝑘 − 𝑟∆𝐴 (1 − 𝑘)]
+(1 − 𝑝)(𝐴 + ∆𝐴 (1 − 𝑘) − 𝛼𝑒 −𝛼𝑠𝑘 ) − 𝑤𝑠 − 𝑣𝑘 + 𝑢𝑘

(4.18)

The optimal staffing level and IoT adoption level of an inflator can thus be calculated.
𝜕𝜋
𝜕𝑘∗

= −∆𝐴 (1 − 𝑝 − 𝑝𝑟) + 𝛼 2 𝑒 −𝑘𝑠 𝑠 + 𝑢 − 𝑣 = 0

𝑘 ∗=
𝜕𝜋
𝜕𝑠∗

1
𝛼𝑠

𝑙𝑛

(4.19)

𝑠𝛼2
𝑣−𝑢+∆𝐴(1−𝑝−𝑝𝑟)

(4.20)

= 𝑘𝛼 2 𝑒 −𝛼𝑠𝑘 − 𝑤 = 0

𝑠 ∗=

1
𝛼𝑘

𝑙𝑛

(4.21)

𝑘𝛼2

(4.22)

𝑤

Summarizing the results for honest nursing homes and inflators, we have Proposition 1 as stated
below:
Proposition 1: NH’s optimal IoT and staffing decisions
a) For both honest and inflating nursing homes, its optimal staffing level is 𝑠 ∗=
b) The optimal IoT adoption level for an honest nursing home is 𝑘 ∗=
adoption level for an inflator is 𝑘 ∗=

1
𝛼𝑠

𝑙𝑛

𝑠𝛼2
1
𝑠𝛼2
< 𝑙𝑛
,
(
)
𝑣−𝑢+∆𝐴 1−𝑝−𝑝𝑟 𝛼𝑠
𝑣−𝑢

1
𝛼𝑠

𝑙𝑛

𝑠𝛼2
𝑣−𝑢

1
𝛼𝑘

𝑙𝑛

𝑘𝛼2
𝑤

.

. The optimal IoT

if inflation condition is satisfied,

i.e., 1-p-pr>0.
c) The optimal IoT adoption level k* and staffing level s* are increasing in  .
Proposition 1 indicates that when a nursing home inflates its self-reporting to gain more profits,
its optimal IoT adoption level is less than the IoT level should it be honest. The result is reasonable, since
IoT limits a nursing home’ inflating ability. It is also noted that in this model, we require uv, so that the
natural log function is defined. In other word, the subsidization makes IoT adoption less costly to nursing
homes, but nursing homes are not awarded more money then what they spent for adopting IoT. It is also
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observed that the optimal IoT adoption level k* and optimal staffing level s* are increasing in .
According to our assumption, the service quality also increases in , so is the revenue.
4.2.3 Nursing Homes’ Staffing Level Reaction to IoT Adoption
In the previous section, we analyzed nursing homes’ optimal staffing level and IoT adoption level
decisions. The two decisions, however, are not exogenous, and may affect each other. Empirical
evidence has been reported in Zhang et al. (2016) and Lu et al. (2015) that the adoption of technologies
has different impacts on staffing levels. In this section, we analyze how nursing homes’ optimal staffing
level will change with respect to changes in IoT adoption levels for honest nursing homes and inflators,
and obtain insights on the relationship between optimal staffing level and optimal IoT adoption level.
According to equation (4.13) and (4.22), for both honest nursing homes and inflators, we have
𝜕𝑠∗
𝜕𝑘

=

1
𝛼𝑘

(1 − 𝑙𝑛
2

𝛼2 𝑘
𝑤

)>0,

(4.23)

then we have
𝑤𝑒

𝛼<√ .

(4.24)

𝑘

In other words, an increase in nursing home’s IoT adoption level will lead to an increase in
𝑤𝑒

staffing levels for nursing homes if 𝛼 < √ , and will lead to a decrease in staffing levels for nursing
𝑘

𝑤𝑒

𝑤𝑒

𝑘

𝑘

homes if 𝛼 > √ . The threshold is 𝛼 = √ .
Proposition 2: The impact of IoT adoption on nursing homes’ staffing decision.
𝑤𝑒

For nursing homes satisfying 𝛼 < √ , IoT adoption will increase its optimal staffing level. For
𝑘

𝑤𝑒

nursing homes satisfying 𝛼 > √ , IoT adoption will decrease its optimal staffing level. The conditions
𝑘

hold for both honest nursing homes and inflators.
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Since the optimal revenue at optimal staffing level
have

𝜕𝑅∗
𝜕𝛼

=

𝑤
𝑘𝛼2

1
𝛼𝑘

𝑙𝑛

𝑘𝛼2
𝑤

is 𝑅 ∗= 𝐴 − 𝛼𝑒 −𝛼𝑠∗𝑘 = 𝐴 −

𝑤
𝛼𝑘

. We

> 0. As discussed in the model introduction part, 𝛼 can be viewed as a vertical position

indicator for nursing homes in its competing market, i.e., for highly rated nursing homes with big 𝛼, their
revenue R is higher.
Proposition 2 thus indicate that for highly ranked nursing homes, increasing IoT will lead to a
decreased staffing level s, while for poorly rated nursing homes, increasing IoT will lead to an increased
staffing level s. This conclusion is in line with the ones found in Lu et al. (2015).
The different reaction of staffing level to IoT adoption can be interpreted in the following way.
IoT adoption improves the efficiency for the staff, thus the marginal quality from more staff increases,
which brings in more staff. This complementary effect of IoT adoption on staffing level. On the other
hand, since we have R concave in k and

𝜕2𝑅
𝜕𝑘 2

< 0, if service quality is high enough, the increased revenue

resulted from additional IoT usage will eventually be overwhelmed by the increasing staff wage, leading
to a reduced staffing level when IoT level increases. This is the substitution effect of IoT adoption on
staffing level. The two effects dominate each other on nursing homes with different vertical positions in
competing markets, leading to a diversified staffing decision on IoT adoption. As a result, adopting IoT
may or may not bring additional profits to the nursing homes, depending on the adoption cost and other
factors.
4.2.4 Controlling IoT by Auditing and Subsidization
Introducing IoT to nursing homes can not only increase service quality, but is also an alternative wa y for
CMS to control inflation in self-reporting other than using traditional audit method. However, due to
investment cost and unforeseen changes in staffing and operations, nursing homes may not have
incentives to adopt IoT, and subsidization may be needed in order to align nursing homes’ incentives for
IoT adoption.
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In this section, we derive conditions to obtain insights on how CMS can control IoT adoption by
auditing and subsidization, and in turn control inflation. We calculate the partial derivat ive of the optimal
IoT adoption level of honest nursing homes and inflators with respect to the CMS’s audit parameter p6
and subsidization parameter u.
For honest nursing homes, k ∗=
∂k∗
∂u

=

1
αs(v−u)

1
αs

ln

sα2

, thus

v−u

>0

(4.25)

since v-u>0, and
∂k∗
∂p

= 0.

(4.26)

For inflators, k ∗=
∂k∗
∂u

=

1
αs

ln

sα2
, thus
v−u+∆A( 1−p−pr)

1
αs(v−u+∆A(1−p−pr) )

>0

(4.27)

> 0,

(4.28)

and
∂k∗
∂p

=

∆A(1+r)
αs(v−u+∆A(1−p−pr) )

since v-u>0, and 1-p-pr>0.
Proposition 3. CMS’s control of IoT adoption by adjusting u and p
a) CMS can affect honest nursing homes’ optimal IoT adoption level by subsidization. The
optimal IoT level is monotonically increasing in u, with gradient

1

. CMS cannot affect honest

𝛼𝑠(𝑣−𝑢)

nursing homes’ IoT adoption by adjusting audit probability p.

6

According to the inflating condition, the relationship between p and r determines the audit policy. In practice,
adjusting audit probability p is usually easier than adjusting punishment ra te r. Similar case can be found in tax
fraud detection, in which IRS has adjusted auditing probability several times over the years, but the punishment
rate is relatively stable. As a result, we consider audit probability p as a decision variable that CMS can adjust
accordingly, but assume r is preannounced and do not change.
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b) CMS can affect inflators’ optimal IoT adoption level by both subsidization and audit. The
optimal IoT level is monotonically increasing in both u and p. The gradients are

1
𝛼𝑠(𝑣−𝑢+∆𝐴( 1−𝑝−𝑝𝑟))

and

∆𝐴(1+𝑟)
, respectively.
𝛼𝑠(𝑣−𝑢+∆𝐴( 1−𝑝−𝑝𝑟))

c) For IoT adoption, honest nursing homes are more sensitive to subsidization than inflators.
According to Proposition 3, the rate for controlling inflators’ IoT adoption level by adjusting p is
∆A(1 + r) times as much as controlling IoT adoption by u. In practice, if ∆A is big, i.e., the maximum
profit gain from inflation is big, then controlling IoT adoption by p is more effective. If ∆A is very small,
and ∆A(1 + r) < 1, then controlling IoT adoption by subsidization is more effective.
The results also indicate that inflators are less sensitive to subsidization than their honest
counterparts. The difference is big when the term ∆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓 (1 − 𝑝 − 𝑝𝑟) is significantly larger than 0. If
∆𝐴 is very small, or if 𝑝 ≈

1
1+𝑟

, such that 1 − 𝑝 − 𝑝𝑟 is close to 0, then difference is not significant.

4.3. Allocating Resources between Auditing and Subsidization
In this section, we analyze the problem from CMS’s point of view, and summarize insights on allocating
limited budget between auditing and subsidization.
Suppose there are totally N nursing homes. The population of honest nursing homes and inflators
are denoted as NH and NI, respectively. The population of honest nursing homes whose rating increased
after self-reporting and inflators is denoted as N HI. The population of inflators (whose ratings also
increase after self-reporting) is denoted as NII. The population of honest nursing home whose ratings do
not increase after self-reporting is denoted as NHN. We assume that the inflate condition is satisfied, i.e.,
p<

1

, thus all inflators will inflate to the maximum amount they can, i.e., except for the measures self-

1+r

reported by the IoT technologies they adopt, they will inflate all other measures. Thus we have N II=NI,
and NIN =0, i.e., there is no inflator who is deterred by the audit policy and decides to stay honest.
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Suppose xi is a binary variable which denotes the audit status of the ith nursing home, x i =1, if the nursing
home is audited, and xi =0, if the nursing home is not audited.
4.3.1 The Damage of An Inflator
The damage of an inflator is normalized to 1, and is defined as di =(1-ki )(1-xi ). If an inflator is audited,
and xi =1, then di =0, and the inflator makes no damage to the rating system. If an inflator is not audited,
and accept IoT technologies to level ki , ki [0, 1], then the damage to the system is 1-ki . It can be seen
that if the inflator’s IoT adoption rate ki is high, i.e., close to 1, then even it is not audited, its damage to
the system is still very small, or close to 0. On the other hand, if an inflator’s IoT adoption level is low,
i.e., close to 0, then if it is not audited, it will make a severe damage to the system, i.e., close to 1.
4.3.2 Two-level Structure
The problem has a 2-level structure, with CMS minimizing inflator damage to the system by determining
audit probability p and subsidization amount Sub at the higher level, and nursing homes, both honest ones
and inflators, maximining profits by selecting optimal IoT adoption level k and staffing level s at the
lower level, as shown in Figure 4-1. Note that the optimal staffing level or each nursing home is not
directly related to the CMS’s problem, but the IoT adoption level ki for each nursing home i directly
affect CMS’s subsidization budget.
The CMS’s problem is to minimize the damage of all inflators to the system, which can be
written as follows.
N

II
min ∑i=1
(1 − k i )(1 − xi )

(4.29)

∑N
i=1 k i u + (NII + NHI )pCAud ≤ B0 + NII pr∆A

(4.30)

II
∑N
i=1 xi = pNII

(4.31)

p,u

s.t.

and the KKT conditions (4.20) describing optimal ki for NII inflators, and the KKT conditions (4.11) for
NH honest nursing homes.
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Figure 4-1 A 2-level Problem Structure

109

4.3.3 Decomposition and Individual Subproblem
To analyze the CMS’s overall problem directly is very complicated. Notice that CMS’s objective is to
minimize the damage of the inflators within the budget. If an inflating nursing home is audited and
caught, its damage to the system reduces to 0. If an inflating nursing home is not audited, its damage to
the system is 1-k, and IoT adoption level k is the only factor restricting its damage. In other words, CMS
wants to limit the damage of the inflators who are not audited to a low level by subsidizing IoT.
For each inflator, it has a probability p to be audited, and probability 1-p to be not audited. The
expected damage can then be calculated as
E[di ] = p ∗ 0 + (1 − p)(1 − k i),

(4.32)

where ki is its optimal IoT adoption level which is determined in the nursing home’s profit maximization
problem. The CMS’s problem can then be decomposed and written as to minimize the expected damage
for each inflator by selecting the right audit policy (p, r), and subsidization amount u. The individual
subproblem can be written as
min E[di ] = p ∗ 0 + (1 − p)(1 − k i) = (1 − p)(1 − k i)

(4.33)

pNII
∑N
i=1 k i u + (NII + NHI )pCAud ≤ B0 + ∑ i=1 ∆A (1 − k i )r,

(4.34)

p,u

s.t.

and KKT condition (4.20).
The budget constraint (4.34) can be written as
𝐻𝑢 + 𝐽𝑝 ≤ B0 ,

(4.35)

where H and J are functions of k.
̅
𝐻 = ∑N
i=1 k i = 𝑁𝑘, and

(4.36)

𝐽 = (𝑁𝐼𝐼 + 𝑁𝐻𝐼 )𝐶𝐴𝑢𝑑 − 𝑟∆A(1 − 𝑘̅𝐼 )𝑁𝐼𝐼

(4.37)
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The problem is highly nonlinear and very difficult to be analyzed quantitatively. We instead
summarize qualitative insights which can help CMS allocate its budget. To analyze the problem, we plot
it in the plane spanned by u and p, as shown in Figure 4-2.
We are interested in the square area where p[0,1], and u[0,v]. According to Proposition 3, k
increases in u monotonically, thus 1-k decreases in u monotonically. Similarly, we can also know that 1k decreases in p monotonically, and (1-p)(1-k) decreases in p faster. For a given damage level d, the level
curve function can be calculated as
𝑑 = (1 − 𝑝)(1 − 𝑘) = (1 − 𝑝)(1 −

1
𝛼𝑠

𝑙𝑛

𝑠𝛼2
),
𝑣−𝑢+∆𝐴( 1−𝑝−𝑝𝑟)

(4.38)

or equivalently,
𝑢 = 𝑣 + ∆𝐴 (1 − 𝑝 − 𝑝𝑟) − 𝑠𝛼 2 𝑒

𝑑
−1)𝛼𝑠
1−𝑝

(

.

(4.39)

Thus we have
𝑑𝑢
𝑑𝑝

= −∆𝐴 − ∆𝐴𝑟 + 𝑠 2 𝛼 3 𝑑

1
(1−𝑝)

𝑒
2

(

𝑑
−1)𝛼𝑠
1−𝑝

.

(4.40)

It can be seen that when p increase, the third term increases, but the first two terms are negative
and unchanged, thus the level curve is convex on the plane spanned by u and p, and can be plotted as
shown in Figure 4-2. The gradient is also plotted which is orthogonal to the level curve, as shown in
Figure 4-2 as an arrow. In this problem, the budget constraint is binding, and the optimal solution is
achieved on the budget constraint, as shown in Figure 4-2 as a red dot.
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Figure 4-2 The CMS’s Damage Minimization Problem (plotted on p and u)

Optimal
Solution

P
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When 𝐻 = 𝑁𝑘̅ is big, the optimal solution moves towards the intersection of the budget
constraint and horizontal axis p, i.e., CMS should allocate more budget in audit rather than in
subsidization. The following cases are included in this scenario:
Proposition 4.1. Cases that CMS should allocate more budget in audit than in subsidization.
i) The total population N is big.
ii) The average level of IoT adoption is already high (𝑘̅ is large).
When 𝐽 = (𝑁𝐼𝐼 + 𝑁𝐻𝐼 )𝐶𝐴𝑢𝑑 − 𝑟∆A(1 − 𝑘̅𝐼 )𝑁𝐼𝐼 is big, the optimal solution moves towards the intersection
of the budget constraint and vertical axis u, i.e., CMS should allocate more budget in subsidization than in
audit. The following cases are included in this scenario:
Proposition 4.2. Cases that CMS should allocate more budget in subsidization than in audit
i) The population of confounding honest nursing homes is high (N HI is large)
ii) Unit audit cost CAud is high
iii) Punishment rate r is low
iv) The additional profit ∆𝐴 that nursing homes can gain is small
v) The average IoT adoption level 𝑘̅𝐼 for inflators is small. (This may be difficult to be observed
directly, but can be partially reflected in the overall average IoT adoption level 𝑘̅ )
4.3.4 Under What Condition Shall CMS Subsidize
It is important to analyze the conditions under which CMS shall consider using subsidization.
From Figure 4-2, we can easily find that when the optimal solution is not the corner point P, CMS should
consider subsidization. Since we have shown the convexity of the level curves, the condition can be
restated as follows: When the slope of the level curve at point P is higher (slope is negative) than the
slope of the budget constraint, there will be a tangent point in the first quadrant, which is the optimal
solution to the problem.
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Proposition 5. Conditions Under Which Subsidization is Necessary
CMS should consider subsidizing IoT when inequality

𝑑𝑢

|

𝑑𝑝 𝑢=0

𝐽

> − is satisfied.
𝐻

Solving the inequality directly, however, is complicated, but we can obtain insights by analyzing
some extreme cases. Consider the case in which the optimal IoT adoption level for all inflators is k =0.
This can happen when r is small, i.e., when nursing homes won’t be punished a lot for inflating. In this
case, d = 1-p, and the inequality (4.41) reduces to
−∆𝐴 − ∆𝐴𝑟 +
∆𝐴 <

𝑠2 𝛼3
1−𝑝

>−

(𝑁𝐼𝐼 +𝑁𝐻𝐼)𝐶𝐴𝑢𝑑−𝑟∆𝐴𝑁𝐼𝐼
̅
𝑁𝑘

̅ +( 𝑁𝐼𝐼+𝑁𝐻𝐼)( 1−𝑝) 𝐶𝐴𝑢𝑑
𝑠2 𝛼3 𝑁𝑘
̅ −𝑟𝑁𝐼𝐼)(1−𝑝)
(
( 1+𝑟) 𝑁𝑘

(4.41)

(4.42)

Equation (4.42) can be interpreted as follows: If the gains from inflation is large, the inflators will
choose to inflate and refuse to adopt IoT. In this case, CMS should not consider subsidization, and the
optimal solution is the corner point P, i.e., to allocate all the budget on auditing. CMS should only
consider subsidization when the inflating gain ∆𝐴 is under certain threshold.

4.4. Conclusion
In this chapter, we create an analytical model to systematically investigate the impact of IoT adoption on
the nursing home rating system and their operations decisions. We derive conditions for inflating and
honest nursing homes to show their optimal staffing level decisions and IoT adoption level decisions. We
find that highly rated nursing homes will have a decreased staffing level when IoT is adopted, but poorly
rated nursing homes will have their staffing level increased after IoT adoption. Since IoT devices can
automatically collect data which is originally self-reported by nursing homes, IoT adoption reduces the
possibility of misreporting. However, IoT technologies can be costly and CMS may consider subsidizing
IoT adoption and push it through, and use it as an alternative way to control rating inflation other than the
traditional audit method. We derive close conditions to show how CMS can affect nursing homes’ IoT
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adoption by auditing and subsidization, respectively. We also obtain insights on how CMS should
allocate limited resources between auditing and subsidization.
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Chapter 5. Conclusion and Future Research

This dissertation consists of three essays which addresses a series of issues in CMS’s 5-star
Nursing Home Compare system. In the first essay, we conducted an empirical study to demonstrate the
existence of rating inflation. We find a significant association between the changes in a nursing home’s
star rating and its profits, which points to a financial incentive for nursing homes to inflate the ratings. By
using the number of patients’ complaints as a proxy of the true service quality, we are able to demonstrate
the existence of rating inflation. A prediction model is then developed, which provides a quantitative
evaluation on the system’s performance. In the second essay, we look into methods to improve the rating
system. By using an innovative graph-based method, we are able to formulate the problem in a linear
form, and solve it based on CMS data. The results show that when minimizing the difficulty to catch
inflators, the current inspection domain is the optimal choice, and an effective audit system is necessary.
An audit system is then designed for CMS, and insights are obtained on setting optimal audit parameters.
In the third essay, we analyze how technologies, particularly IoT, can affect the rating system and nursing
homes’ operational decisions. A game theoretical model is developed with CMS minimizing inflation
damage at the higher level and nursing homes maximizing profits at the lower level. We propose that IoT
adoption subsidization can be an alternative method for CMS to control inflation, and we analyze how
CMS can affect nursing homes’ IoT adoption level by auditing and subsidization. We also obtain insights
on CMS’s budget allocation between auditing and subsidization.
The results in this dissertation pinpoint the key issues in CMS’s nursing home rating system, and
provide a guideline for CMS’s rating system reform. Some of the results can also be extended to other
rating system sharing similar features. For example, the physician rating system developed by CMS also
uses a combination of inspection and self-reported measures to generate ratings, thus the inflation
detection method we developed in chapter 2 can be applied to this system easily.
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